Washington subway crash
2-Two killed, others injured in Washington subway crash
WASHINGTON, June 22 (Reuters) - At least two people were killed and others were injured when a Washington D.C. subway train derailed and smashed into another train on tracks on the outskirts of the city during Monday's afternoon rush hour.
The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, which runs the "Metro" subway system, said a six-car Red Line train headed out of town derailed and collided with another train at 5 p.m. EST/2100 GMT on Monday.
"At this point right now we can confirm that there are two fatalities," the authority said in a statement.
The accident trapped passengers in one or more of the subway cars. Emergency rescue personnel were seeking to free the passengers, while others carried injured people off the trains on stretchers.
"We are working to first get everyone outside of the train and everyone who needs medical attention will get (it)," the general manager of metro system, John Catoe, told reporters.
Catoe said that up to 70 people "walked off" the trains, but had no immediate estimate of the number of injured.
Fox television's local news affiliate showed passengers being escorted from a Metro train outside the Fort Totten station. The station said power to the station was shut off.
A reporter with the tv station said he saw what appeared to be a body covered with a sheet, and several injured passengers including one wearing a neck brace.
"One train was on top of another... I can confirm one fatality from having seen the victim," a CNN reporter at the scene said.
Witnesses said fire department vehicles and ambulances were also at the scene, while television pictures showed rescue officials taking injured people off the tracks.
Metro is a heavily used subway system in and around the U.S. capital.
Not that this isn't a terrible enough tragedy on its own, but doesn't Glatt ride public transportation? Hope he is ok...
The death toll has risen to nine.
I believe HM takes the train.
Sound off, HM.
Here's a
link that's updated more frequently.
*shakes head* God that musthave been terrifying.
It could have been a lot worse. The trains were heading into the city during the evening rush hour, which means they should have been fairly empty. If it had been one of the packed outbound trains, there would have been many more dead.
Happy Monkey drives from DC to VA, so he should be fine.
It's messed up. There had to be multiple failures for this to happen.
I stay out of DC to the extent possible. The government there is generally run by idiots, and the place is very violent. It will probably turn out that somebody at the Metro did something stupid, was high on coke, or something else. Or maybe texting, like the driver in Boston.
I may sound extreme, but I have lived in Silver Spring for years, and things are better than when that coke-head Marion Barry was mayor, but they still elected him to the council, and he has recently exerted his moral authority (!) to oppose gay marriage.
Remember the controversy over the word "niggardly"? Some of the great civic leaders of DC thought it was a racial slur. That is some indication of their level of intelligence.
The civic leaders don't run Metro, so that has nothing to do with it.
It's too soon to know what caused this.
I could write a very long post on this. In a nutshell, the trains are driven by computers. Autopilot, if you will. The computers get their information from thousands of sensors throughout the system. Those sensors are on the trains themselves (mainly in the doors) and also on the tracks. Either there is a problem with the computer, or there was a faulty sensor somewhere. The thing is, there are supposed to be multiple layers of safety so that one faulty sensor won't result in a crash. Sensors in trains fail all the time, and they take those trains out of service and fix the sensors. Those failed sensors never result in a crash, so there has to be more going on here. Probably some sensor on the track.
The drivers can take control of their train in an emergency, the driver of the train that rear ended the other must have been distracted or incapacitated, on top of the autopilot failing.
It's all very unusual, and required multiple layers of failure to happen.
On the radio they said that the NTSB recommended three years ago that they replace their equipment which was old and outdated.
It'll certainly be sorted out soon enough. The finger pointing and blame, the investigation... hopefully something positive can come out of it so that we prevent a similar problem in the future.
Glad you are ok Glatt.
On the radio they said that the NTSB recommended three years ago that they replace their equipment which was old and outdated.
There has been a huge budget problem for years, and much of the equipment in Metro is outdated and in need of maintenance or replacement. The safety stuff was supposedly being maintained though.
Part of the budget problem for Metro is that there hasn't been a dedicated outside funding source like other major cities have. It goes through two states and the District, so nobody feels like it's their responsibility. Like all public transportation, fares only cover like 50-75% of the operational costs.
It's all very unusual, and required multiple layers of failure to happen.
This is why IT requires paranoid weirdos who are on the verge of the Autism spectrum with their obsessive thought processes. Nobody else is risk-averse enough. The IT guy who asks you frustrating questions and insists on doing things a certain way, is acting that way for a reason. Everybody else figures that things will "just work out" somehow, but that's not how it works. No system runs well without some weirdo losing sleep over it.
This is why IT requires paranoid weirdos who are on the verge of the Autism spectrum with their obsessive thought processes.
You rang?
What? No stimulus money earmarked for this? Sheesh! This is right in their backyard - WTF?
Actually, I think there is money earmarked for local rail (Chicago's Metra expects some anyway). But it's not available yet.
... It will probably turn out that somebody at the Metro did something stupid, was high on coke, or something else. Or maybe texting, like the driver in Boston.
...
... In a nutshell, the trains are driven by computers. Autopilot, if you will. The computers get their information from thousands of sensors throughout the system. Those sensors are on the trains themselves (mainly in the doors) and also on the tracks. Either there is a problem with the computer, or there was a faulty sensor somewhere. The thing is, there are supposed to be multiple layers of safety so that one faulty sensor won't result in a crash. Sensors in trains fail all the time, and they take those trains out of service and fix the sensors. Those failed sensors never result in a crash, so there has to be more going on here. Probably some sensor on the track.
...
Uh-oh. Stupid, stoned, texting computers. What next?
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090623/ap_on_go_ot/us_dc_metro_train_derailment
"The subway train that plowed into another stopped train, killing at least seven people and injuring scores of others in the nation's capital, was part of an aging fleet that federal officials had sought to phase out because of safety concerns, an investigator said Tuesday.
But the Metrorail transit system kept the old trains running despite warnings in 2006, said Debbie Hersman of the National Transportation Safety Board."
"Hersman said investigators expect to recover recorders from the train that was struck. The train that triggered the collision was part of an old fleet that was not equipped with the devices, which can provide valuable information to determine why the crash occurred, Hersman said.
She told The Associated Press that the NTSB had warned of safety problems and recommended the old fleet be phased out or retrofitted to make it better withstand a crash. Neither was done, she said, which the NTSB considered "unacceptable.""
Our leaders at work.
ok, fine if thats the case - find out who is in charge? "insert name here" Now cut his or her balls off. If its a committee, make a party of it and do them all. Our leaders NEED to be held accountable again.
"The leading train had stopped because it was waiting for another train to leave the Fort Totten station, officials said.
It was unclear why the following train had not received the signal to stop as well, or why the operator did not stop her train manually when she saw the tracks blocked ahead of her, officials said.
Passengers on the second train said it did not slow down at all before impact. "There was no attempt at braking. We just slammed into whatever we slammed into," passenger Theroza Doshi told Reuters."
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE55L69G20090623
Not paying attention.
Bad leadership in providing obsolete equipment (the board is appointed by our glorious representatives), and bad operator.
The death toll has risen to nine.
I believe HM takes the train.
Sound off, HM.
I take the train whenever possible, but it's not possible for my commute.
My dad and sister both commute on the Red Line, but neither commute crosses the accident site. My dad got caught for a bit when they stopped all trains on the line, and they'd restarted everything by the time my sister got to her stop.
glad to hear you are ok as well as your family!
Compare this to a crash nearby the Cellar in a place called Warminster. That is a single track. In that case, the signaling system did something the train engineer never saw happen. She kept calling for clarification even though the light said go. But her calls went unanswered. So she refused to move for over 5 minutes. As anyone knows, everything must always have a backup. The backup did not work. So she did what responsible people do: assume the worst and take appropriate caution.
Well, another train was racing towards her. Since she was stopped, the damage and dead were minimal.
Do you have the necessary attitude? Do you always set the parking brake - or so hate humanity as to trust that silly little pin triggered by a transmission in park? Same concept. How many will be so critical of an engineer now killed in the crash - rather than admit they too are just as irresponsible?
ok, fine if thats the case - find out who is in charge? "insert name here" Now cut his or her balls off. If its a committee, make a party of it and do them all. Our leaders NEED to be held accountable again.
Yes, and we NEED to spend on aging infrastructure! WTF is WRONG with people in power? :headshake
Yes, and we NEED to spend on aging infrastructure! WTF is WRONG with people in power? :headshake
Simple.
Build a flshy new sports stadium = lots of publicity = votes.
Maintain and repair the stuff you already have = boring = look like you're doing sod all = no publicity = no votes.
:headshake , but what ya gonna do?
Flashy sports stadia generate money for the teams inhabiting them, therefore they generate campaign donations for the election of people who got them built.
Infrastructure doesn't generate enough ongoing profit for those involved. Infrastructure is more along the lines of a one time bribe or graft under the table to secure the contracts, get it made into a Davis Bacon project so the unions get their cut, that sort of thing.
I'm not sure that's exactly how it works over here Els. If I'm right, Zen is refering to a recent election campaign here in Qld.
Well when the system can't even get enough ridership to support itself then money has to come from somewhere else. Metro doesn't belong to DC, MD or VA so no elected leader is truly directly responsible for providing for it nor is the tax base of either jurisdiction.
Fares and parking are already too high so there really isn't much they can do.
Besides, I'm not about to blame the "sensors" when you can see from a mile away that you are about to run into something big that ain't moving.
Until an autopsy is performed that shows the driver was conscious just before the crash, I think it's not appropriate to blame this on the dead driver.
Maybe she was slumped over in her seat having just had a heart attack. Maybe she tried to stop, but the brakes didn't work. Nobody knows at this point.
How about this, the companies who operate the stuff should be REQUIRED to upgrade it every so often, at their own expense. Like, power companies should be responsible for their own upgrades. Why the hell should "we the people" have to pay for this shit with our tax dollars when we also have to pay for the service? It's just WRONG. And once the infrastructure is upgraded, with our tax dollars, you can bet your ass the power companies will raise the rates for the "new and improved" service. :mad2:
WE need a new program like the one that built the Hoover dam! My vote is currently for a friggin wall much like the Great wall of China - Heck that thing is 400 miles long. Ours won't be nearly that long. We can also put nice clean medical facilities on the Mexican side so that the illegals can have their children safely on THEIR side. This creates a huge number of long lasting jobs, prevents the illegal immigration problem an reduces the American burden on everything, most importantly healthcare.
While I agree illegals put a strain on the system, more importantly is health care for profit. Until that issue is addressed, the system will never get better.
Infrastructure doesn't generate enough ongoing profit for those involved.
But it does provide ongoing employment for kin and hacks.;)
So the investigators yesterday came out with a little more information.
They confirmed that this particular train was in automatic mode, and was being driven by the computer. They also confirmed that the emergency brakes had been applied. The button had been depressed in the driver's cabin, and the brakes themselves had the bluing that you would expect from emergency application. Also, the tracks had "skid marks" on them.
What they didn't say was how long the skid marks were, or how early the brakes had been applied.
It's frustrating that they didn't include this important information, so I tried to figure it out myself.
If you go to Google Earth and look at the accident scene, you can measure from the point of impact back in a straight line until that straight line gets obstructed by something, and then you know how far away the driver should have been able to see the stopped train. When you do this, you will see that the accident happened at a curve, under a bridge, and the visibility was actually pretty bad. The driver, if she had been paying 100% attention to the track in front of her, would have first seen the corner of the stopped train when she was about 355 meters away. At that particular location, according to the Washington Post, the train speed limit is 59 miles per hour. A train traveling at 59 miles per hour will cover 355 meters in 13.5 second. She wouldn't have seen the full train until she was about 160 meters away or 6 seconds from impact.
I don't know how long it takes to stop a train traveling at that speed. In normal operation, the trains take a while to stop, but they are trying to do it gently for the passengers' comfort.
So she had 13.5 seconds to see the stopped train, realize it was stopped, notice her own train wasn't stopping, still wasn't stopping, and slam on the emergency brake. She did all those things, but apparently not fast enough.
The head of Metro said that there is no evidence that she did anything wrong. But autopsy results, blood tests, cell phone, and texting records haven't been released yet.
The train had an unusual configuration. It had a lead car that normally isn't used as a lead car. In theory, it should have worked fine, but trains were seldom set up that way. And that lead car was overdue for brake maintenance. It's possible that the unusual configuration caused the autopilot to misread the situation and not stop.
I mentioned multiple layers of failure before. We now have: unusual train configuration, possible bad brakes, train stopped on a curve, and a "driver" who may have taken a couple seconds too long to apply the emergency brakes.
Google Earth has an image with a train directly at the end of your yellow line? Impressive!
I heard that a passenger had told his family, the night before, that he would hop the train to work in the morning. It's as if it were a set-up! [\levity]
That's a great post glatt, thanks.
Google Earth has an image with a train directly at the end of your yellow line? Impressive!
Yeah, it was lucky! And it was a 6 car train, like the ones involved in this accident, so I could measure it and put place marks in Google Earth to show almost exactly where the stopped train was. And then measure back from those points to see the sight lines.
That's a great post glatt, thanks.
Thanks!
Fairly accurate, too. The brakes were apparently on for
300-400 feet, or about 120 meters.
Thanks for that info HM. 300-400 feet, huh? That's a much better driver reaction time than I expected. Judging from the damage, the train must have been going very fast. In fact, many of the passengers said the train hit at full speed. So it sounds like the brakes were not very effective. I'd expect the speed to be reduced dramatically over that distance, based on my own experience on Metro. I bet only some of the cars had brakes that were working, or there were other problems with the brakes.
That's good work, Glatt, but I'm not *entirely* convinced. Maybe the track is raised so the driver can see over the green areas beside the track. Does the driver sit on the left, right, or center of the train? Is the seat elevated? How are the pylons on the bridge aligned? What angle was the sun coming from?
There are so many possible sources of minor error that a couple of little things like this could add up to seriously affect the calculations.
That said, you figures are probably in the ballpark.
To me, two facts stand out - the investigators say the brake pedal had been pressed down, yet passengers report feeling no braking. :eyebrow: Add that to all that stuff about old train cars with poorly maintained brakes, and I'm happy to jump to a conclusion.
The driver sits on the right, IIRC, and is not elevated. The track was
not elevated.
The rails show 300-400 feet of braking. I would imagine that in a seatbeltless vehicle like a subway car, the slamming of the emergency brakes would feel much like a collision, so there may be confusion. The brakes were apparently triggered by a button, not a pedal, so they are probably pretty close to all-or-nothing.
For what it's worth, we have had a very wet spring, and foliage is very lush here right now. It's quite possible that the vegetation along the side of the tracks is more overgrown in real life than in the image found on Google Earth, and the sight lines may be even shorter as a result with all the weeds hanging off the chain link fence. I also don't know where the supports for the bridge are located, since they aren't visible in the Google Earth image, so I measured as if there were none. The presence of bridge supports would also make the sight lines worse than my post.
My point was that 355 meters was about the farthest away the driver could possibly see any part of the stopped train. My gut tells me that it was more like 250 meters before it became obvious.
So she had 13.5 seconds to see the stopped train, realize it was stopped, notice her own train wasn't stopping, still wasn't stopping, and slam on the emergency brake. She did all those things, but apparently not fast enough.
The average emergency reaction time is something like 0.25seconds, or something to that effect as I recall. See event, process, take action.
This is an online test where you test your own:
http://getyourwebsitehere.com/jswb/rttest01.htmlI think it's much different in her situation. This is nothing like driving a car and seeing something in the road ahead that you need to avoid.
The train is computer controlled. She is not supposed to take control of the train unless there is an emergency. Her job is to announce the upcoming stations, and close the doors when it's time to pull away from that station. She would get in trouble if she took control and there was no emergency. If she slams on the brakes, she's committing to an action that is going to disrupt the red line during rush hour. She's got these competing directives in her brain. Keep the train going on time. Don't do anything to slow it down and mess up rush hour. Her experience (which was limited by the way - she'd only been a train operator for 6 months) is that the train has always slowed down on its own in the past.
So she needs to make a judgment call about whether it really is an emergency. After a few seconds it was clear to her that it was an emergency, and she hit the panic button.
Plus, I wonder how well even the most dedicated person would do on that website if it took hours or even days for the trigger to occur.
Plus, I wonder how well even the most dedicated person would do on that website if it took hours or even days for the trigger to occur.
let alone six months, as in her case.
It makes me wonder about the wisdom of having the trains run by computer and the drivers just there as a back-up. The computers ensure that accidents virtually never happen, but when they do, the driver isn't at 100% attention, so they don't always catch it right away. On the other hand, if the drivers were in complete control all the time so that they were paying attention, human error would eventually creep in, and there would probably be more accidents.
It makes me wonder about the wisdom of having the trains run by computer and the drivers just there as a back-up.
So that humans can perform their job, roads must be (but not always) designed so that the human can see beyond what is required to stop (which is also why superior cars use orange - not red - rear turn signals). Trains don't do that. Trains are dependent on a signaling system. Therefore the train operator could not stop the train. Train was traveling too fast around a blind corner for the operator to do anything. This is normal on most every railroad.
Blind turns are typically not a problem. Reason why this crash is reported: because train crashes are so close to zero as to be virtually zero. The system works.
And so again, the questions. Why did backup systems fail? For example, one backup system is maintenance people who are empowered to do their job. Why was this train's computer not instructed by track sensors (as latest reports suggest)?
Again, I am going right back to the reason for such failures. How often do you also use the parking brake? Exact same attitude with equal consequences. Deaths and injury created by not applying the parking brake are rarely reported, in part, because it happens.
About six months ago in a nearby town, she got out of the car to get the mail. Car in park started rolling down the driveway. She ran to jump into the car just as the car door hit a tree. She remained there for 45 minutes until someone bothered to look closer. Death directly traceable to someone who did not routinely implement (enable) a backup system. And simply too common to get equal attention.
85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management. This crash is a perfect example of management in denial - without any grasp of the problem - without sufficient knowledge to address the problem with all due action - without sufficient attitude to listen to what the employees knew all along. Now the question - what is the education of all top managers in the Washington Metro? They did not even know how bad the system's signalling was?
From the Washington Post of 21 Jul 2009:
D.C. Metro Circuit Failures May Be Widespread, Officials Say
Any attempt to selectively quote the more important points would only subvert the entire message in that news report.
Okay, did somebody hack tw's account? I can't read these sentences with a straight face.
Okay, did somebody hack tw's account? I can't read these sentences with a straight face.
So you loved it when seven Challenger astronauts will murdered for the same reason. So you loved it when so many were murdered on the Washington subway as management knew Metro signalling was failing everywhere in the system? In many cases, the solution was to turn off the safety system. Often what empolyees do when management does not provide the necessary support, attitude, and knowledge. So that the safety system did not cause a crash, the solution was to turn off safety devices - when management refused to address the problem.
without sufficient attitude to listen to what the employees knew all along
what, specifically, are you talking about here? There is no mention in the article you cited that any employees knew of a problem.
Other news reports have mentioned that warnings came from other transit agencies in the country that they were having similar problems with the same kind of track sensors. But I've seen nothing that says employee warnings went unheeded.
It's true that they don't know what the problem with the one sensor that caused the crash is. They could replace it and move on, but they want to figure it out first. I'm not impressed that it's taken weeks and they still don't know.
Well, the problem with Metro circuits is widespread.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/23/AR2009072301575.html
"According to the National Transportation Safety Board, the track circuit at the crash site has functioned irregularly since December 2007. Its performance deteriorated further five days before the June 22 crash, when it apparently failed to detect the presence of a train outside the Fort Totten Station, permitting another to plow into it. Nine people were killed, and 80 were injured.
The new information from the NTSB suggests that as long as 18 months ago, Metro officials could have found defects in the track circuitry where the accident occurred. Metro officials said Thursday that they did not know the circuit had been intermittently malfunctioning because they did not conduct tests that would reveal that specific problem.
Metro General Manager John B. Catoe Jr. likened the different level of analysis to a blood test. "When you have blood drawn, you can ask for test A through 25," he said. "We were only doing test one." "
In other words, we could have found it if we had looked. I am not impressed.
"Federal investigators found that the circuit began "fluttering," or intermittently malfunctioning, after Metro crews installed a device known as an impedance bond, also called a Wee-Z bond, at the circuit in December 2007, according to a safety board advisory issued Thursday. Metro has been installing new bonds across the 106-mile railroad as part of a project to boost power so the agency can run more eight-car trains, which consume more electricity than shorter trains. Each track circuit has two Wee-Z bonds.
The fluttering indicated a problem with the circuit, according to the data examined by the NTSB. After Metro crews replaced the second Wee-Z bond in the same circuit June 17, the circuit deteriorated to the most dangerous stage: It intermittently failed to detect the presence of a train. Five days later, a train idling in that circuit outside the Fort Totten Station was hit from behind by another train. "
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/22/AR2009072203524.html
"In addition, a source with knowledge about Metro's repairs said Wednesday that 11 track circuits on the Orange Line, from Minnesota Avenue to Deanwood and up to New Carrollton, were recently found to have problems detecting the presence of trains. One was disabled Monday night and put back into service Tuesday, said the source, who asked to remain anonymous for fear of retaliation. "
Which says to me that now that they are looking at stuff they are seeing a lot of problems previously ignored. I think that we were very lucky to go as long as we did without an accident.
I am glad I do not ride the Metro. And I do not think that important information should have to be given out anonymously, "for fear of retaliation".
The average emergency reaction time is something like 0.25seconds, or something to that effect as I recall. See event, process, take action.
This is an online test where you test your own:
http://getyourwebsitehere.com/jswb/rttest01.html
I averaged 0.2406. The kid who hit me might get 78.345. :right:
what, specifically, are you talking about here? .
There are no such thing as accidents. We may have another classic example of "85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management."
From the Washington Post of 9 Aug 2009:
Metro Safety System Failed in Near Miss Before June Crash
The crash-avoidance system suspected of failing in the recent deadly accident on Metro's Red Line malfunctioned three months earlier, when a rush-hour train on Capitol Hill came "dangerously close" to another train and halted only after the operator hit the emergency brake, newly obtained records show. ...
The National Transportation Safety Board, which is investigating the June 22 crash, learned of the March incident last week when notified by the little-known Tri-State Oversight Committee, said NTSB spokeswoman Bridget Serchak. Metro officials did not immediately respond to questions about why they did not notify the NTSB.
The Washington Post discovered the incident while reviewing documents obtained through a public records request filed with the oversight committee, which was created 12 years ago to monitor Metro. ...
In an April 29 letter ... He said the train "violated a block," meaning it improperly shared a section of track with another train, and "came dangerously close to the leading train." Madison, a planner for the D.C. Transportation Department, wrote that it was only by "coincidence" that a Metro employee later noticed the incident in computer records. ...
After the June crash, Metro officials said that the malfunctioning track circuit at the accident site was "a freak occurrence" and that they were unaware of other incidents, including near misses, that stemmed from failures in the safety system. ...
NTSB says it appears that Metro's control system failed to detect a stopped train and that an approaching one did not receive a command to stop.
That is multiple failures. Similar problems were observed previously when humans averted crashes. Metro spokesmen even denied these problems existed only to learn about them after the Washington Post discovered them. A previous failure was only discovered by coincidence. All imply a serious management problem exists where management does not know how the work gets done. Where employees have the attitude and knowledge provided by management.
Later in the meeting, the panel discussed a June 3 letter in which a Metro worker alleged "that the ATP system was unreliable." Metro declined to comment on the reference.
There is one employee who will find future employment difficult. The problem with being honest when management would rather lie or deny - and then take revenge.
NTSB yesterday
announced that it still has no fucking clue what happened, but that there are serious unknown problems with the control system of METRO and probably a handful of other systems in the country. So those systems should be careful.
Thanks guys. That's real helpful. Didn't we know this within the first week?
How are the rail systems supposed to check their shit if you don't tell them what to check for?
It's all moot right now, since the trains are still being manually operated after the crash. The red line still has not been fixed, because in 3 months, they still haven't figured out what is wrong with it to fix.
What the hell? The track circuit is right there. It's not like it was destroyed in the crash. They can duplicate the failure, but don't know what causes the failure? Get some electrical engineers down there, stat.
Sheesh. Have they checked the o-rings?
You think there'd be a whole system in place for testing and calibration and errors and fixes...scary.
I think they don't bother because 99.9998% of rail crashes are attributed to operator error. Not saying that's the actual cause, just saying that's where the blame is laid.
I think you're a bit hasty in flipping the bozo bit, Glatt. I didn't see anything in that article that says that they've been able to reproduce the conditions that caused the accident. And I can tell you from experience that debugging can be hard. Especially so when you've got hardware and software involved. Not to mention that part of the circuit is train tracks that live outdoors.
Before pointing and laughing at these folks I'd want to know if they have access to all the circuitry and microcode involved. If they don't, they're trying to debug this thing blind. I'd also like to know if they've been allowed to try to reproduce this under working conditions. They may not. Metro may not want to risk squishing one or two of their trains to find the answer to this issue.
Certainly it's an intricate dealing. You think there'd be a flowchart or something. ;)
...or a graph! We like graphs :rolleyes:
I didn't see anything in that article that says that they've been able to reproduce the conditions that caused the accident.
It wasn't in the article I just linked to, but there was a test shortly after the accident that recreated the conditions and the result was identical to the crash, except they didn't actually smash the trains together.
Article about it here. Three months ago.
Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board performed the simulation Wednesday night. In the test, investigators positioned a train in the same location as the train that was rear-ended Monday. The system failed to detect that the idled test train was there
I know it's not easy to figure out, and they are only human, but it's been 3 months. They have had the track closed to train traffic for that entire time, available for study. It's just sitting there. They have to single track around the site and it's causing serious delays for the poor saps on the Red line.
The sensor manufacturer is Alstom Signaling, and it's some sort of problem with their sensors. Or a problem with how their sensors are installed into the system.
Shawnee is right with her o-ring joke. We need Richard Feynman to stick one of these sensors into a glass of ice water and figure it out.
Just for the record, they finally opened that stretch of track this week. But they still don't know what's wrong with the sensors, so all the trains are still being operated manually. My guess is that this is now how things are going to run on the system. The new standard.
...Right up until a negligent train driver causes a wreck, and they suddenly decide that what we really need for safety is computer automation...
You think there'd be a whole system in place for testing and calibration and errors and fixes...scary.
From the Washington Post of 23 Oct 2009:
Metro to test new software for crash-avoidance system
After a fatal Red Line crash in June, federal investigators said Metro's crash-avoidance system was inadequate and called for the agency to implement a real-time backup. …
Metro uses a software program to check for circuit malfunctions. Since the Red Line crash, those software checks have been run twice a day to look for anomalies. If problems are found, crews are sent to inspect the circuit; if necessary, adjustments are made on the spot.
No problem! If a collision avoidance system fails, a program will discover it up to 12 hours later. IOW report why those two trains collided. 85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management. When management is technically dumb, then a protection system (that does not execute during the rush hour and only operates twice a day) is more than sufficient.
After all, trains don’t collide. When the collision avoidance system failed repeatedly previously, trains did not collide. Therefore don’t worry; be happy. What any management says when employees work for them.
Some believe the operator was at fault. Even that is often directly traceable to top management that did not provide the necessary atttitude and knowledge.
Another indication of a company that may have management problems. From ABC News on 23 Oct 2009:
Cockpit Voice Recorder Unlikely to Provide Answers in Northwest Overshoot
Investigators trying to determine why two Northwest Airlines pilots were out of contact with air traffic controllers for more than an hour Wednesday night might have a hard time trying putting all the pieces together. ...
Asked how many years of service the pilots have and how many hours they were into their shift, a Delta spokesman said, "We are not sharing as that is all part of the investigation." ...
Monday at 6:05 a.m., Delta flight 60 from Rio de Janeiro to Atlanta landed on a taxiway instead of the parallel runway where it was supposed to touch down.
Management failures continue in the Washington Metro system. Over a month ago, a track worker was killed. Trains are supposed to be notified of track work ongoing, also see warning signs that track workers are ahead, and slow to 10 MPH in that construction area. And yet many workers note trains fly through construction areas at 50 MPH - full speed.
Death only in the Washington Metro account for over 40% of all American railroad workers. The 22 Jun crash and death of six passengers did what? Yesterday, add two more deaths. From the Washington Post of 27 Jan 2010:
NTSB investigates Red Line accident that killed 2 Metro track workers
Federal officials investigating the deaths Tuesday of two Metro employees are trying to determine why the driver of a Metro utility vehicle did not know that the men were working behind him on the tracks. ...
Five Metro workers have been killed on the tracks in the past seven months. The safety problems, including a Red Line crash June 22 that killed nine people, have triggered an upheaval in Metro's leadership ...
Tuesday's accident occurred about 2 a.m. near the Rockville Station when a truck, modified to operate on the rails and moving in reverse, backed into two technicians who were working on the tracks as part of a separate crew.
How often do so many failures continue until someone views the only common factor in all events? Death and near death stories have been almost monthly now on the Washington area Metro. From the Washington Post of 8 Jan 2010:
Report finds slapdash safety culture at Metro
ANEW REPORT by the agency that monitors safety on Metro makes chilling reading -- nearly as chilling as the experience of some of the safety inspectors who helped write it. One team of inspectors was nearly run down by an onrushing Metro train on the tracks last month even as it was examining safety conditions for Metro track workers. According to the inspectors, the operator of the train made no attempt to slow down, let alone stop, or even to acknowledge the presence of the inspectors who had to scramble out of the train's path to safety.
That incident, which took place Dec. 10, sheds light on the some factors that have contributed to the deaths of six Metro workers hit by trains since October 2005, including two who were killed in the past five months even as the agency was conducting its review of track workers' safety. ...
They also extend to what appears to be a perverse culture when it comes to safety at Metro, in which train operators and track workers regard each other with open antagonism; Metro safety classes do not bother to teach Metro's own safety rules; and the transmission and accuracy of critical information -- for instance, the presence and location of track workers in the path of trains -- is slipshod and unreliable.
They are not called accidents. They are murder. But when a murder is directly traceable to top management, then we call it an accident.
The review found that train operators were speeding up rather than slowing down, as required, as they approached track workers who had not been fully cleared from the track right of way.
That attitude should result in assault (if not murder) charges. So weeks after the chilling report, what happens? "Two more dead in Maryland"
What did the Navy do when problems existed. Navy had a three day stand down of the entire Navy. Management addressed problems directly traceable to top management.
How did Marchionne fix Fiat? In sixty days he fired all top management. Therefore Fiat became so productive as to even buy Chrysler. Only public silence can explain so many Washington Metro murders - especially when investigations have made the reasons so flagrantly obvious.
The incident this week was caused by human error. There was supposed to be a lookout on the work crew watching for oncoming rail traffic. That publicly unidentified person was not doing his/her job. That's not management, that's worker incompetence. A lazy co-worker killed those two track workers the other night. The track maintenance truck that backed over them was going in reverse and had limited visibility. The track workers were supposed to be watching for it.
But I suppose you are right. Management should identify the slacker lookout and punish him/her and make sure everyone else is doing their job.
Metro is fucked right now. It's seeing reduced ridership because of the economy and because some people are turned off by all the safety problems. So it has reduced revenue. They are holding public hearings shortly to discuss whether they should cut service, or raise prices, or both. That's going to hurt them even more as it pushes more riders into their cars.
But I suppose you are right. Management should identify the slacker lookout and punish him/her and make sure everyone else is doing their job.
If that rear observer is not there, the driver should stop. IOW at least two people were violating the rules. But then read the comments from third parties. For example, the wife notes employees were not even provided working safety straps. Employees are ordered to sign off on safety training that was never provided. And threatened by management if they do not sign to a lie.
These are not accidents. Employee actions are directly traceable to 'attitude and knowledge' which only management defines. That is a management primary responsibility as even defined by William Edward Deming. To provide the attitude and knowledge. Even Federal inspectors noted how employees would speed up when safety runs demand they slow to 10 MPH - because even inspector lives were threatened by employee safety violations.
One employee may be a personnel problem. Routine violations - that is only blatant management failure.
Six deaths on 22 Jun before this got any attention? Washington area residents should be screaming for the heads of all senior Metro management. Instead, mostly silence. And a post that blames an employee for doing what is apparently routine.
Meanwhile, that truck must also have a beeper when backing up. No beeper apparently meant two workers never knew the truck was coming. Even the workers could not protect themselves. A construction truck without that backup beeper should never even leave the shop - if management is doing its job.
From the Washington Post of 13 Feb 2010:
Safety system derails D.C. Metro train on wrong track
A Red Line train leaving the Farragut North Station on Friday morning ended up on the wrong track and was automatically derailed by safety devices to prevent a possible collision with another train, according to Metro sources familiar with events. ...
After leaving Farragut North, the train left the main track and went onto a short stretch of track, known as a pocket track, which is similar to a breakdown lane on a highway. Trains are often routed to a pocket track when something is occurring ahead of them and they should not proceed.
Although it is not clear why, controllers in Metro's downtown control center had set the switch to route the train onto the pocket track, according to a Metro source, who did not want to be identified because the incident is under investigation.
That source and another Metro source said the train operator had failed to stop at a red signal on the main track. According to procedure, the operator should have stopped and contacted the control center. ...
In November, records showed that Metro had quietly barred safety monitors from walking along its live tracks to assess Metro's compliance with its own safety rules. During the ban, two workers were hit on the tracks and fatally injured. In late January, two more Metro workers were fatally injured when struck by a utility vehicle on the tracks.
An analysis by The Post of safety data showed that more than 100 Metro safety flaws -- identified after audits, accidents and other incidents -- had gone uncorrected.
Thanks for that info tw. I hadn't gotten around to looking up further reports about why that train derailed.
I rode metro yesterday, and it was really bizarre what they were doing. They were running trains every 25 minutes, instead of every 5 minutes, due to some problem with the snow, so they only had a 5th of their normal capacity. There were dark trains parked in a couple of the stations underground, so they were switching the live, passenger carrying, trains around the dead ones. When I arrived at my normal station in the suburbs to begin my commute, they had cones set up to force all passengers to the tracks that are normally outbound. So when the crowded train came 25 minutes later, it was coming from the "wrong" direction for that track.
The frustrating thing was that they could have been running 8 car trains so that more people would fit on each one, but the trains were only 6 car trains.
I left work 2 hours early to beat the inevitable horror show that was obviously coming at the end of the day, and got home fine, but the paper this morning has front page news of the horrible evening commute. The federal workers who went in at staggered times on a delayed opening in the morning all left at exactly the same time at the end of the day and gridlocked the city and overwhelmed the Metro.
What a way to run a railroad!
In our hippy-fascist social utopia Down Under, senior management can be held criminally liable for workplace deaths. The charge isn't "murder" but can still result in prison. Do you have that in the Great Satan?
The NTSB is holding hearings this week. The first day of hearings provided no new information. Yesterday did provide
some very interesting information that I hadn't heard before.
Alstom, the maker of the sensor that mysteriously failed to sense a train, causing the Metro train crash last June, is blaming Metro for using 3rd party hardware in the circuit. They mixed brand new 3rd party hardware with a 40 year old circuit and didn't give the technicians installing the new hardware instructions on how to do it correctly.
The Metro engineer, Johann Glansdorp, "was told Alstom would not consent with the mixing of equipment," said Illenberg, the lead Alstom representative for the investigation. During the overnight shift June 16, Metro replaced the component as part of an upgrade of its aging track system.
Illenberg said the specific risk associated with using non-Alstom equipment is that it would require boosting the power level of the device. That, in turn, could increase the potential for a signal malfunction that could prevent the system from detecting a train on the tracks, causing a crash, according to industry sources.
tw is right, it is Metro management's fault.
In interviews with federal investigators, Metro technicians who worked on the portion of track involved in the accident before the crash said the installation of equipment by Union Switch & Signal caused speed and power problems because it did not properly match the existing equipment, much of which they noted was 40 years old. "That's obviously mismatched," said Thomas Barcheski, a 21-year veteran of Metro at the time of the crash, according to a transcript of his interview.
Barcheski said he had asked superiors for new procedures for testing and handling the equipment but was told that there were none and that no training on it was provided by Metro. "We're not given anything," Barcheski, an automatic train control mechanic, said in his interview.
Metro officials testified Tuesday that information about new testing requirements was in the 2006 bulletin. But Alan Nabb, a senior Metro official, testified Wednesday that distribution of the bulletin to Metro's 190 technicians was "probably uneven."
Barcheski told investigators that he was not aware of those testing requirements. Moreover, employees said they were frustrated at their inability to fix problems linked to the new gear and were discouraged about trying to get the construction crews that installed the devices to return to adjust them.
"It fell on deaf ears most of the time," said Bruce Weibel, an automatic-train-control mechanic.
This information is finally coming out. So they know it's a problem with electronic hardware compatibility, but they still haven't fixed it. I know because the trains are still being driven by humans. The derailment less than two weeks ago was caused by driver error, as pointed out by tw above. The human drivers are now causing accidents. It's time they fix the circuits and get the trains back to computer control again.
The cynic in me says they deliberately won't be fixing the circuits until the whole investigation and final rulings are done, because to do so would be admitting that that was the problem in the first place.
The cynic in me says they deliberately won't be fixing the circuits until the whole investigation and final rulings are done, ...
I also integrated late 1950 electronic technology into 1980s equipment. It's not hard or difficult. It does not create reliability failures. Electricity never changed. But it requires an engineer (or other patriotic American) to have proper information (ie all tech specs) AND for management to understand significance of technical facts so that management can provide the necessary "attitude and knowledge". What did change?
Alstom warned against mixing components across all train control systems.
That says near zero - by itself is literally insulting to all readers. But then something cryptic follows about power mismatches. Ok. Reporter is not doing her job. Posting hearsay rather than numbers. Good reporters, at a minimum demand and then quote numbers even if she does not understand them.
However the reporter did include what any 15 year old would understand:
Moreover, employees said they were frustrated at their inability to fix problems linked to the new gear and were discouraged about trying to get the construction crews that installed the devices to return to adjust them.
"It fell on deaf ears most of the time," said Bruce Weibel, an automatic-train-control mechanic.
Is that hearsay - subjective statements - more informative? No numbers means the reporter's information is almost insulting. But at least she provided something minimal.
The Alstom bi-phase data port can only output 10 milliamps. The Union Signal receiver requires 12 milliamps minimum. We don't know anything until we have those numbers. Then a significant minority learn from the 1% how simplistic this really is AND how much contempt management had by not knowing something that students in college physics labs measure. If responsible management was told this, then a responsible management would have shut down that entire region - replaced all signaling with emergency flagmen.
If those numbers were provided, then reporter’s other hearsay (subjective) quote has credibility. Any manager in Metro - even personal director - who could not understand significance in those numbers should be fired for not being sufficiently educated in basic management principles. Answers must always include the perspective of numbers. Without numbers, then perspective is easily replaced by emotion and wild speculation.
Demonstrated is the same problem in this discussion:
Toyota stop sale.
Apparently we do not only have a serious Metro management problem. We also have an investigation committee or newspaper reporter with the same problem. Answers given without numbers should result in sharp condemnation. People died. Subjective citations simply insult even the victims. No numbers why the problem would not be fixed; requiring, if necessary, widespread and public condemnation.
There is sufficient evidence to indict management. The investigation committee’s job is to obtain facts – especially numbers – to convert an indictment into a scathing accusation. Doing any less would even insult victims of that crash. And should concern every Metro user.
How to have a solution. It starts with the reporters always including numbers. If a power mismatch exists, the reporter must include the appropriate numbers or a URL. Numbers must always exist to provide the necessary perspective. No numbers is how the "politically correct" get problems ignored.
Yeah. Well, the Post is a shell of its former self. I'm just glad they had a reporter at the hearing.
Sounds like the same thing Toyota is trying to do with their electronics.
Yeah. Well, the Post is a shell of its former self.
Is it the Post that is degrading? Or is it a new breed of reporter taught to be a communication major and therefore does not understand how to ferret out the irrefutable fact?
I was amazed back at Watergate and again during "Mission Accomplished" how Bob Woodward routinely corralled facts. I was always amazed how David Habersham even identified an American defeat in Vietnam by viewing facts ... in 1963. And I routinely have contempt for the local 'Action News' or NBC Dateline who spend so much time with gossip or hype for ratings. I truly miss Ted Koppel.
Is it the Post that does not have talent? Or are so many communication majors do not learn what is necessary to have a fact? There are fundamental reasons why all military academies graduate everyone with engineering training. The military needs people who can analyze and extract the irrefutable fact.
Sounds like the same thing Toyota is trying to do with their electronics.
Demonstrated is the same problem in this discussion:
Toyota stop sale .
Does Metro have severe problems? 40% of the deaths in America are all one that one transit system. Numbers are damning. By not providing numbers, someone is either hiding something. Or someones are simply not able to grasp fundamental and damning facts. Or a third possibility. The entire Metro management is being manipulated for a massive beheading. I doubt it. But that is also a possibility.
C'mon, tw. The reporter isn't cross examining these people, just reporting what is said in the hearings. It's up to the people holding the hearings to ask for details.
The mother load of detailed public documents about this crash investigation is
here at the NTSB site.
I was looking for a transcript of the hearings, but don't see one.
I found an
official aerial map of the sight distances, similar to the one I whipped together in the days after the accident on Google Earth, looking for answers that nobody was providing.
So of course, I had to see how close I was in my armchair analysis.
I wrote that:
If you go to Google Earth and look at the accident scene, you can measure from the point of impact back in a straight line until that straight line gets obstructed by something, and then you know how far away the driver should have been able to see the stopped train. When you do this, you will see that the accident happened at a curve, under a bridge, and the visibility was actually pretty bad. The driver, if she had been paying 100% attention to the track in front of her, would have first seen the corner of the stopped train when she was about 355 meters away. At that particular location, according to the Washington Post, the train speed limit is 59 miles per hour. A train traveling at 59 miles per hour will cover 355 meters in 13.5 second. She wouldn't have seen the full train until she was about 160 meters away or 6 seconds from impact.
According to the official map, drawn by people on the ground with survey equipment, the stopped train was partially visible at a distance of 1,118.2 feet (or 340.8 meters.) I said it was partially visible at 355 meters. The official report said the train was fully visible at a distance of 471.0 feet (or 143.5 meters.) I said it was fully visible at 160 meters.
I had been measuring from the position of the crashed trains, and it turns out the stopped train was pushed down the track about 3-4 meters by the impact, and I hadn't accounted for that. So my calculations were pretty damn close. Much closer than I expected.
C'mon, tw. The reporter isn't cross examining these people, just reporting what is said in the hearings. It's up to the people holding the hearings to ask for details.
Which was my question. Which one forgot to report the numbers?
Bottom line - the numbers were not provided and are absolutely necessary.
The mother load of detailed public documents about this crash investigation is here at the NTSB site.
I was looking for a transcript of the hearings, but don't see one.
This document says why the failure happened.
Critical is something called bobbing. In simple terms, a transmitter at one end of two rails sends an audio signal to a receiver at the other end. Each interlock has its own frequency. If the receiver 'hears' the signal, then a relay closes. If anything appears on that track, the rails are 'shunted' together. No transmitter signal gets to the receiver. The relay opens. A train must be on that track when no signal is heard.
But the system has been defective (intermittent) for two years. Bobbing constantly. No useful solution implemented by identifying the problem. IOW repairs rarely identified a problem before 'fixing' it. They did what so many (probably a majority of) untrained A+ Computer Techs do. They just keep replacing parts until something worked.
And yes, this summary in
Toyota stop sale applies. In both cases, we are talking about a logic one condition, a logic zero condition, and the always existing third state. The world is not binary. The world is ternary. That interlock system had noise that caused 'bobbing'. Caused constant failures (an intermittent failure is a complete failure).
In one case, while trying to fix bobbing on one track, suddenly bobbing was observed on an adjacent track. It is not clear if or why the adjacent track was also not fixed.
Other factors are discussed implying significance. The phone system was inoperable or unreliable even though conversations essential to human safety were reportedly conducted on that system. Rains had completely flooded phone and signalling wires days previous. But the reason for bobbing appears (may be) completely different. And something that no track maintenance people could possibly discover. They needed serious and better trained assistance. Instead they kept shotgunning.
A failure exists. So one keeps replacing parts until failures go away? Nonsense. Unfortunately so many never learn how to analyze before solving a problem. So they shotgun.
Bottom line: from what I understand, that entire section of track was completely unreliable for almost two years. At minimum, every engineer should have been trained to approach Fort Totten as if the system was always defective. We know this new (three month) engineer did what she was trained to do and what the signals told her to do - went through a blind curve at normal speed.
That report has numbers that the reporter should have been reporting. Bobbing was even reported via the remote data units (RDU) that receive that information every one second. But (apparently) no system existed to alarm on bobbing so that network operators could take immediate emergency action. Bobbing at the highest levels of management was considered all but normal operation. 85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management.
When bobbing occurs, transmitter power is changed (ie increased) in some desperate hope to solve the problem using the Tim Allen joke: "More Power!". Those new and 40 year old signalling devices are compatible. But require adjustments that are always done anyway on every track.
If the reporter was reading facts, she would not hype about mixing 40 year old equipment with new equipment. She would have read the report. Noted (by my definition of reliability) that entire section of signalling was completely defectve - intermittent. And that nobody had identified the problem. Just kept trying to fix it - for two years.
Shotgunning (except in a few instances) was the only repair technique. If your auto mechanic used shotgunning, he should be quickly unemployeed. And yet so many Americans so little learn how to analyze (solve) problems that shotgunning (especially in computer repair) is normal. It appears shotgunning was relavent for causing nine deaths. And it appears the reporter also did not identify the actual problem. Her report without the word 'bobbing' is woefully negligent.
Also discovered were supervisor errors:
During postaccident interviews, TSSM, ATC mechanics working on the Red Line stated using PMI 11000 – High Frequency Track Circuits adjustments procedures for GRS modules. They further stated having no procedures to adjust or to verify track circuits when US&S impedance bonds were installed with GRS ATP modules. Neither the CIT crew leader nor the ATC mechanics interviewed mentioned the October 6, 2006 engineering bulletin during their interviews. The CIT supervisor mentioned he was aware of an engineering bulletin, but understood the engineering bulletin only applied to high current substation return impedance bonds and did not apply to regular impedance bonds.
WMATA provides form PM-1, Track Circuit Adjustment to record all track circuit adjustments and verifications performed under the PMI 11000 procedure. Column seven of the form is labeled Shunt Test and provides two columns to place a check to indicate if a shunt was used on the transmitter end and/or the receiver end of the track circuit. The form is contradictory to the October 2006, Engineering Bulletin since it does not provide the option to indicate if three shunts were used for track circuit shunt verification as specified in the bulletin.
IOW after upgrading the signalling system, they are suppose to duplicate a train (shunt the rails) at each end and somewhere in the middle. Employees were only doing what management told them. Management failed to provide the necessary 'attitude and knowledge'.
Postaccident train control historical data were reviewed and indicate that at approximately 1:33 am on December 12, 2007 track circuit B2-304 was down. The data correspond to the date and time the high current substation return impedance bond at chain marker B2-311+71 was replaced. This is the B2-304 track circuit receive impedance bond. The data further indicate that about five hours later, track circuit B2-304 began bobbing between train movements. The bobbing continued intermittently until the day of the accident.
The crash was in 2009.
Postaccident data from the morning of June 17, 2009 indicate track circuit B2-304 was performing irregularly during the time the track circuit adjustment and verification process was conducted. Because of the frequent bobbing of track circuit B2-304, the shunt verification tests could not be verified to confirm the CIT crew leader statements made in the postaccident interview. According to the postaccident data, the performance of track circuit B2-304 changed significantly just prior to the arrival of the first train. From the time the impedance bond was replaced, the track circuit was bobbing and the track relay was seldom energized for more than 30 seconds between drop outs. Nine minutes before the arrival of the first train, the track circuit began staying energized for minutes at a time and was only bobbing for a second or two. The data further indicate that train detection failed for the first and nearly every train during the entire occupancy of track circuit B2-304 after the impedance bond was replaced on June 17, 2009 until the time of the accident.
We should be discussing murder charges.
How obvious was the problem?
Postaccident inspection of the signal equipment in the train control room at the Fort Totten station identified the B2-304TR electromechanical vital relay for track circuit B2-304 to be out of correspondence with the physical location of the accident trains. The track relay was energized with both accident trains still shunting the occupied track circuit. After removal of the accident wreckage, track circuits in the vicinity of the collision were tested using a 0.06 ohm and a hardwire shunt. Track circuits B2-344, 336, 328, 322 and 312 were tested with a single 0.06 ohm shunt at three different locations, at the transmitter end, in the middle and at the receiver end of the track circuit. All track relays de-energized in response to the detection of each shunt. Track circuit B2-304was then tested and detected a 0.06 ohm shunt at the transmitter end of the circuit. The track circuit however failed to detect a 0.06 ohm or a hardwire shunt in the middle of the track circuit.
With two crashed trains on the track, the signalling hardware still reported the track empty. The reason for crash was immediately obvious to all Metro managment. Later tests showed signals would detect trains at both ends of the 738 foot track. But not in the middle.
The report then goes on to explain why maintenance people needed high tech help. But high tech assistance was not called. Instead, they just kept replacing parts on wild speculation - shotgunning.
That report has numbers that the reporter should have been reporting.
Nonsense, the
normal newspaper reading public's eyes would just glaze over at the numbers in that report. They only want to read who is blaming whom for the failures. It's not up to them, or you, to figure out the technical details of what went wrong. That's the job of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, and the people they employ. I doubt the shiny shoed whores in the front office would understand the technical aspects of the system, or it's failures, but they are definitely obligated to create a culture that understands and responds to these numbers. They failed to do that, and are accountable.
Nonsense, the normal newspaper reading public's eyes would just glaze over at the numbers in that report.
Which is why no reporter should have mentioned Challenger's O-rings or below freezing temperatures at launch. It just confuses Americans who are now that dumb.
The O'ring, in this case, is 'bobbing'. Bobbing is the damning fact ignored for days in this location. A problem ongoing throughout the day - and ignored. A similar even even discovered in another Tri-State Oversight board evaluation that the board accidently discovered in March 2009. Even the 'near victim' train operator was not aware of a failure. But we are all so dumb as to need our reporters to also keep us dumb.
Meanwhile glatt did the reporter's job. Kudos.
Only eyes that glaze over are those that love to be dumb and stupid. They don't have any business reading newspapers anyway. Maybe we should pass a law that if one is dumb and stupid, then he must not be permitted to buy a paper. That would solve everything.
We should be discussing murder charges for those nine deaths.
Investigative journalism is very nearly dead.
Most readers want easily digestible answers so they know who to blame; doesn't matter if they're correct. Managers want profit - more stories from fewer staff - so journalists have become churnalists - recycling press releases and web stories. And that is before we even get into sinister conflict of interest/mass-manipulation/distraction issues.
Oooh look look! Brangelina may be breaking up!
Frankly, for this issue at least, I'd trust the cellar investigative team more than I'd trust even the WaPo.
Meanwhile glatt did the reporter's job. Kudos.
glatt did an excellent job of figuring out why the operator of that train couldn't possibly stop in time under manual control.
But that is not the meat of this investigation, which is why the automatic controls don't work, haven't worked for quite a while, and they've been unable to fix them.
Insulting the general public as stupid, because the don't understand the technical details, is unfair and just mean spirited.
Insulting the general public as stupid, because the don't understand the technical details, is unfair and just mean spirited.
I am saying the public is so intelligent as to need those numbers. You are saying people are so dumb that their eyes glaze over. So deny everyone the critical facts.
Numbers and facts (ie bobbing) are so critical so that the 1% can further inform the other curious minority. How to keep everyone dumb? Deny facts so that the 1% or 5% cannot inform the rest. So that extremists can control the stage with their emotional tirades.
How to create extremists. Don't provide facts and numbers. Then 70% of Americans will believe Saddam had WMDs and attacked the WTC. Learn from history. Stop calling Americans too dumb to understand numbers.
We should be talking about who is guilty of murder - now that the safety board provided numbers the reporter could not bother to provide.
glatt did an excellent job of figuring out why the operator of that train couldn't possibly stop in time under manual control.
Was never able to discover when the train fully braked so aggressively as to blue rails. But why that braking did not continue in the second half of the stopping efforts. Did the train operator stop breaking or ease off the brakes during the second half of that deceleration? Could not find an answer for why rails suffered bluing and skid marks only in the first half; not in the second half.
That is a damn good question. I wonder if the investigation will even address it.
My understanding from what little I've read about the bakes is that when the train is in automatic mode, driven by the computer, you apply the brakes by hitting the panic button. The brakes then go on with full force and don't come off. It's an all or nothing emergency brake.
Gradual braking can only be done if the train is in manual mode and the driver is actually driving.
During the crash, this train was in automatic mode.
There's something strange going on if the skid marks stop and then continue again.
There's something strange going on if the skid marks stop and then continue again.
Your picture shows the same thing. The bluing of steel rails are marked where it started and stopped. I can think of maybe five different reasons for this. For example, the braking system adjusts for maximum braking after first locking the wheels. Or the operator ran for her life (which is not supported by anything in witness testimony or in the operator's body). Or it is normal for bluing to stop once the wheels get so hot. Or ...
It simply remains a curious question. I saw nothing that explains that behavior.
Most curious is testimony of one 'sandaled' passenger sitting in the middle of the first car. He saw the front start collapsing. He ran. Whereby the floor and carpeting picked him up that placed him in the back of the car up in the ceiling. He was unhurt. And the guy sitting across from him who did not run also walked away unhurt. Another curiosity.
The investigation is done. Reason why this crash happened was even traced to oscillations from a push pull amplifier. Feedback that occurred only when installers increased output power. And explains why this problem also caused bobbing on other adjacent tracks five days before nine people were murdered.
So much information that I may have missed it: why rail 'bluing' is only in the first half of that crash.
BTW, also interesting is a train operator who literally disobeyed Central command (OCC) instructions to stop in Silver Springs. Who proceeded to the next station anyway. Attitude among Metro employees was (apparently) that bad. The train that nearly harmed investigators because it passed at full speed instead of a required 10 MPH - and was reported by the Washington Post. Both he and his supervisor were reprimanded for being that irresponsible. But it does not say what happened to them - how they were punished or retrained. Or if they were only doing what management encouraged.
Information in that safety investigation implies repeatedly why 40% of all rail fatalities occur on the Metro system. We should be discussing murder charges in Metro management.
Documented are safety problems (bobbing) that existed for years without resolution. That a repair crew even left the offending signals bobbing five days before the fatal crash. Another report demonstrates why these are not accidents. Why 85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management. From the Washington Post of 5 Mar 2010:
FTA delivers scathing report on safety of D.C. Metro
The sternly worded report ... was the first in-depth look at Metro's safety program ... It revealed deep-rooted deficiencies at the transit agency and its independent oversight committee, highlighting vulnerabilities in the systems that are supposed to safeguard passengers and workers, he said.
The report excoriates Metro executives and the independent safety monitors at the Tri-State Oversight Committee, citing failures that include:
Metro has no process to ensure that safety problems are identified in a timely fashion. Top leaders don't receive regular reports about safety issues. The safety office has been marginalized within the agency, lacks access to key data about subway operations and has been left out of decision-making.
As a result of those problems, the report says, the safety office has allowed known hazards to remain uncorrected for years.
That's sufficient for Daily News (tabloid) readers. For others who learn the whys before knowing anything, useful facts are buried at the end of the article:
Federal auditors found systematic failings in the way Metro identifies and prevents safety problems. Metro has no process or "single point of responsibility" to guarantee that hazards are spotted quickly. The agency has no database for long-term tracking of safety issues. When auditors asked for a list of the "top 10" safety concerns, they were told that Metro had no such list.
Top Metro executives also make critical decisions about operations without analyzing potential hazards, auditors found. Nor is there effective coordination among key operating departments -- such as rail operations, track maintenance and engineering -- to find and manage maintenance-related safety issues, Rogoff said.
The FTA report said Metro's safety office "is not 'plugged-in' to critical conversations, decision-making meetings and reporting systems that provide information on hazards and potential safety concerns throughout the agency." Critical documents, reports and decisions are not shared with the safety office, the report says.
Auditors also said that since 2007, when Catoe took over, four people have been in charge of safety. The department has been reorganized six times in five years, losing personnel and technical expertise. One-fourth of the 41 staff positions allocated to safety remain vacant. Safety, the report said, "has insufficient resources to keep up with a growing backlog of accident and incident investigations."
We see this when business school graduates do what is taught in those schools. "A good manager can manage any business." We should be discussing murder charges. The business school mentality – it was only an accident.
View back 6 months to earlier posts. How long ago were the symptoms screaming 'failure at the highest levels of management'? How criminally negligent are those failures now that facts have arrived? It is classic business school attitude - there is plenty of blame to go around. Nonsense. We should be talking murder charges. It was not an accident.
If it's not intentional, it's an accident. Even preventable accidents, are accidents.
If it's not intentional, it's an accident. Even preventable accidents, are accidents.
Which works with business school concepts. And is contrary to the well proven concepts taught by W E Deming. This is no accident. Management had to intentionally pervert all well understood and required safety functions to make death possible. Alienate safety functions which, on spread sheets, means reduced costs.
Those technicians ended their shift reporting that the interlock was bobbing - on both rails. For five days, nobody did anything. No management system even existed to detect what the employees knew. That was an accident? Only if you are from a business school where failure is an option. Where human life is measured in dollars. And where technical knowledge of the business is something dirty to avoid.
They did not even have a list of their top ten greatest safety problems. Typical of management that is only concerned with spread sheets. And that is trained to call it an accident so that Deming's concepts can be ignored.
It was no accident. Deaths directly traceable to overt and intentional negligence at the highest levels of Metro management. Quoted reports make that obvious. They did not do their jobs – for years. They even subverted safety functions - for years. So people died - uselessly.
We are waiting for their defense: there is plenty of blame to go around. Blame others. Maybe we should blame the victims for their own death?
Damn straight. Anyone fool enough to ride the Washington subway knows what they are letting themself in for. We should make those bleeding heart whingers pay for the cost of the inquiry! I mean, there wouldn't have been any deaths at all if they hadn't got on that train. Simple.
You're joking, but it's actually true. The riders are paying for all of this. Ridership has gone down since the accident and since the economy has taken a hit, and as a result, Metrorail has raised fares to cover the budget gap. Once the lawsuits from the victims have gone through, and they have received their millions of dollars, Metrorail will be out even more money, and fares will be raised again. The riders are the customers, and we will pay for it all.
Metro used to be a world class transit agency, but it's looking more an more like it was ruined by one person. Catoe.
Cato? Washington est delenda and all that?
The Washington subway system is still being run in manual mode, and this time,
it looks like it prevented an accident. The details aren't clear, but it looks like a couple days ago the signaling system allowed two trains to get too close to each other. One was about to rear end a stopped train in a station and the driver engaged the emergency brake to prevent a crash. Some speed control system appeared to be malfunctioning and let the second train enter the station too fast.
:headshake
This sucks.
For crying out loud, hasn't tw got that fixed yet?;)
he's about 85% done. :hedfone:
NTSB is having their final meeting as I write this, and they will release the executive summary of their report after the conclusion of the meeting. The full report will be released in a few weeks.
I expect it will blame the accident on Metro's mixing of parts in the signaling system, turning up the power on those parts to get them to work together, and the bobbing that resulted from turning up the power, making the train invisible to the computers. I think they will also say that the cars need to be hardened so they don't crumple as much on impact. I think all the blame will be placed at Metro's feet. We'll soon see.
And Metro will turn around and dump it on some schmuck in maintenance.:eyebrow:
Isn't the crumpling design specifically done to create an accordion effect? Not good if you are in one, but still. I would think they are lighter, meaning more fuel efficient, and cheaper - always the money...
The crumpling in this case is more along the lines of splitting open and allowing the other train to smash right through the entire car, so it's not really such a good feature. But I think they should focus their efforts on preventing the crashes in the first place and not so much on making them more survivable.
If the report is accurate, it will identify the number one reason for this and other problems.
Metro management was asked to provide a list of their top ten problems. Metro had no list. Had done no problem studies. Did not know of existing problems rampant throughout the system (ie bobbing was only one). Classic when management is educated in business schools.
A repair crew left the scene with signals still bobbing. Crew informed management. Management ignored the failed system, had no means of reporting the failure, and did nothing for two or three days. Then the crash happened.
Problem was transistor leakage. Rather than fix the problems, repair crews did the only thing they could - adjust power. A problem that required people with far more knowledge and equipment. Management that comes from where the work gets done would have known that. But instead, management philosophy was to ignore problems - to disempower employees in a way described in Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged. The signal was bobbing for days - until eventually someone was killed.
Management's job is to work for the employees. No list of their top ten problems existed. Absolutely essential if they were working for employees. Management did not. Therefore some 60% of all rail worker deaths in this nation were on one system - Metro. Informed management calls it murder. Incompetent management called numerous events accidents.
A classic example: 85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management.
♪♫ It seems to me I've heard that song before
It's from an old familiar score
I know it well, that melody♫♪
From the Washington Post of 28 July 2010:
NTSB blames '09 Metro crash on track circuit failures, negligent safety attitude
Metro has known since the 2005 Rosslyn near-crash that the automatic train-control system had experienced dangerous breakdowns but had not widely implemented a track circuit test developed after that incident, the NTSB found. ...
Instead, with track circuit problems setting off thousands of alarms each week, workers at Metro's Operations Control Center were not acknowledging them, NTSB investigator Ruben Payan said. "Unfortunately, they were being ignored because of the large amount that were being reported," he said. ...
Metro was aware of track circuit problems as far back as 1988, the NTSB said. ...
The NTSB said Metro should replace the 1,482 circuits that were built by GRS. Metro tested those circuits after the crash and found that 208 had the same malfunction that caused the crash. ...
With undisguised irritation, Hersman criticized Metro for not implementing many previous NTSB recommendations aimed at improving safety. "It's almost like we are talking with someone who is tone-deaf. They are not hearing it, they are not getting it and they are not addressing the problems," she said. "Our frustration is that if they don't listen this time, I am not sure what can be done."
... that as of January, Metro board Chairman Peter Benjamin had not placed safety oversight in the board's mission statement and that former chairman Jim Graham had not heard of Metro's safety oversight organization, the Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC). For its part, they said the TOC lacks "teeth" and cannot force Metro to be accountable for safety problems.
"This accident is a classic organizational accident," said NTSB member Robert L. Sumwalt.
Organizational accident is the politically correct way of saying management committed murder. But we should not charge them with the crime.
The system so routinely failed - and management considered failure so normal - that the operation center routinely ignored all alarms for signal failures. That should be called murder.
You're right, tw.
NTSB identifies the problem, but has no authority to force them to fix it, and the real underlying problem is the way Metro runs through 3 jurisdictions, so there is no single entity in charge of it.
With undisguised irritation, Hersman [the NTSB Chair] criticized Metro for not implementing many previous NTSB recommendations aimed at improving safety. "It's almost like we are talking with someone who is tone-deaf. They are not hearing it, they are not getting it and they are not addressing the problems," she said. "Our frustration is that if they don't listen this time, I am not sure what can be done."
Congress needs to step in and transfer oversight of Metro to the Feds. It needs a single qualified leader. And a single dependable funding source to supplement fares.
Or raise the rates enough to cover expenses, after chopping the compensation of management to the level of the workers.
public transportation needs subsidies to compete with the automobile, which gets tons of subsidies too.
There's this widespread idea that public transit should lose money, and be a tax-supported entity.
This may be the one thing wrong with public transit that getting Libertarian on their ass, and doing transit on a for-profit basis instead, would cure every trouble transit ever had. Through the impulsion of the market.
Time was, public transit was done on a for-profit basis. It also worked. You could research that.
There's this widespread idea that the road system should lose money, and be a tax-supported entity.
This may be the one thing wrong with the road system that getting Libertarian on their ass, and doing road works on a for-profit basis instead, would cure every trouble the roads ever had. Through the impulsion of the market.
Time was, the road system was done on a for-profit basis. It also worked. You could research that.
Sure thing, Glatt old man. They were called toll roads. Still to be found here and there. You could research that.
[Holding the Snickers back... preferring a Pay Day...]
OK. I'll research that.
According to the
CIA Factbook, the US has 6,465,799 km of roads. 4,209,835 km are paved, and 2,255,964 km are unpaved. Of the paved roads, 75,040 km are expressways. Of the expressways, according to
Wikepidia, 4700 km are toll roads.
So to summarize:
6,465,799 km of roads total
4,700 km are toll roads and are presumably self supporting
That works out to about 7 hundredths of one percent of the roads in the US are paid for directly by the people who use them. 99.93% of the roads are a "tax-supported entity" which is some sort of evil thing according to you.
Let's contrast that with the DC Metro system, the topic of this thread. Its 2010 operational
budget is funded roughly 52% by passenger fares.
7 hundredths of one percent vs. 52 percent. Which one is the bigger tax supported entity?
Before you get the wrong idea, let me be clear that I think all roads should be free and should be tax supported entities. We all benefit from them. But I also think public transportation should be subsidized because we all benefit from it.
Whoa, where the hell do you think all those state and federal gasoline taxes go? That's why we have the roads we do. And the roads aren't just to get your ass to work and back, they also move your groceries to the store and the emergency services to your house.
Yeah. I agree. That's why I said that we all benefit from roads and that I support having them paid for with taxes.
I'm arguing that public transportation shouldn't be criticized for also being supported partially by taxes.
If you raise fares to cover 100% of the cost of public transportation, that's the same as killing public transportation. It wouldn't be able to compete with cars, which drive on roads that are 99.93% funded by taxes. And it's not just gasoline taxes that pay for the roads, it's also property taxes, income taxes, and maybe even some sales taxes that pay for building and maintaining roads.
Fine, subsidize your commute with taxes on the people served by that system. Why should I pay part of your fare?
Because it makes the roads semi-usable at rush hour? Right now my treasured Route 422 is basically a joke between 7:30 and 9am, and between 4:30 and 6 pm. They have so far failed to put a regional rail route out my way. I would pay to take cars off this road.
But then again, the regional rail they wanted to build was so damn expensive. This is the part that I just don't get. It's just goddamn rails and the rails are already there, even, but they wanted like 2 billion dollars to do it. Really? WTF! They built an entire fuckin transcontinental railroad in 1869, but nobody can add a Septa route without an ass-searing federal subsidy? What is so hard and expensive about this shit?
The same reason I help pay for the roads around you that I never use.
The benefit of the public transportation here to people here who never use it is that the roads are less congested. There are 1.2 million trips each day taken on the metro system here. If those 1.2 million people each got into a car and got on the road, there would be gridlock. 1.2 million additional cars each day will overwhelm any city. Just think of what traffic is like when there is a sporting event going on and there are an additional 30,000 cars on the road.
There's the whole issue of one region being taxed and having their money sent off to pay for services in another region, but that's been going on since the beginning of time and is not unique to mass transit at all.
Why should I pay part of your fare?
Just guessing here - Do any of the goods or supplies you use/purchase travel along those roads? Probably.
It's just goddamn rails and the rails are already there, even, but they wanted like 2 billion dollars to do it. Really? WTF! They built an entire fuckin transcontinental railroad in 1869, but nobody can add a Septa route without an ass-searing federal subsidy? What is so hard and expensive about this shit?
Because they must lay all new tracks for that route. Tracks you refer to are the Main Line. Roads are lousy for moving good. Rail must do that. Existing tracks must get freight from Chicago to NYC (actually Newark), Philadelphia, and Baltimore in two days. That means no train stops until it arrives. That means no passenger trains must be on that line.
And that must exist because roads are inferior for moving freight any significant distance.
To provide mass transit on the 422 corridor, new tracks must be built. And suburban towns must provide 500 and 1000 car parking lots. Everybody wants. Nobody wants to give.
Septa management, once people who came from mass transit, were replaced by business school graduates. Another major transit line goes through Gywneed Valley. A large open tract existed right next to the railroad on Route 202 - a major highway. A 1000 car parking lot, easily accessed from a highway, provided easy parking and a high speed direct access to Philadelphia. Express trains that fill up and then don't stop for the next 15 or 20 miles.
But that means one had to think like an engineer. No longer possible in an America dominated spread sheet thinking. As soon as business school graduates took over, the plan died. Now the entire large open space contains maybe 30 or 50 homes.
Another example of myopic thinking; why your mass Route 422 plan will never happen.
Well Pottstown - a major hub on that rail link, once had large open spaces to support parking for that rail link. With so many thinking myopically, Pottstown built a new town hall and other structures on that land.
Let's see. Traffic signals were failing about 8000 times every week - for at least five years - probably longer. But fixing them costs money. Requires management who thinks in terms of reality - not in terms of spread sheets. This had nothing to do with who pays for what. This is directly traceable to the same myopic reasons why that Rt 422 mass transit plan can never be implemented. People who think like myopic business school graduates. Same people who designed GM cars. People with a graveyard mentality. Cheaper was to let people die in a major train crash rather than fix the signals. Doing so made all spread sheets look better.
No difference between any of those events and the people who murdered seven Challenger astronauts. It’s not about solving problems when myopia and business school thinkers are doing the planning.
Don’t worry. Be happy. Business school graduates incapable of vision - and plenty of spread sheet analysis. Myopia. Also called political correctness. It completely justified 8000 signal failures weekly on the Washington Metro - for almost a decade without any intention of fixing it.
snark/All those graduates from those liberal schools can't think for themselves.../.snark
The same reason I help pay for the roads around you that I never use.
And I pay for roads around you, why should I pay for part of your train ticket too?
The benefit of the public transportation [COLOR="Red"]here[/COLOR] to people [COLOR="red"]here[/COLOR] who never use it is that the roads are less congested. There are 1.2 million trips each day taken on the metro system here. If those 1.2 million people each got into a car and got on the road, there would be gridlock. 1.2 million additional cars each day will overwhelm any city. Just think of what traffic is like when there is a sporting event going on and there are an additional 30,000 cars on the road.
And when the roads are gridlocked, plus the cost of parking in DC, paying the actual cost of that train ticket won't look so bad, will it?
There's the whole issue of one region being taxed and having their money sent off to pay for services in another region, but that's been going on since the beginning of time and is not unique to mass transit at all.
Oh excuse me, I should pay part of your ticket, Because We've Always Done It That Way.:rolleyes:
Because they must lay all new tracks for that route. Tracks you refer to are the Main Line. Roads are lousy for moving good. Rail must do that. Existing tracks must get freight from Chicago to NYC (actually Newark), Philadelphia, and Baltimore in two days. That means no train stops until it arrives. That means no passenger trains must be on that line.
Tracks I refer to are not the Main Line but a freight line going up to Reading. I did further reading and the line is owned by Norfolk-Southern. N-S is, for the most part, fine with passenger use on those tracks.
To provide mass transit on the 422 corridor, new tracks must be built. And suburban towns must provide 500 and 1000 car parking lots. Everybody wants. Nobody wants to give.
This is true; on the R5 Paoli, which is on the Main Line, the parking lots are 150-250 spots and they are all rated at 99% capacity every day.
Another example of myopic thinking; why your mass Route 422 plan will never happen.
I think it will. The current plan is to toll 422 with EZ-Pass, to pay for the
strategic long-term "master plan" that they have come up with, which includes creating the R6 Norristown extension, improving Rt 422, improving the roads people will take to avoid 422 so they don't get tolled, revitalizing some downtowns, etc. and whatever else the hell they wanted to put in there. They paid real engineering firms real money to create real fancy multi-colored maps and stuff. It looks all scientriffic.
They figure Route 422 drivers will cough up enough money on a routine basis to pay for a $500 million bond, and they think the R6 line can be done for that, including $50M in Rt 422 bridge re-do at the Schuylkill river crossing.
The question of why did it cost $2B when the feds wanted to do it, and now costs $500M when the locals want to do it, is moot, since the federal project was shot down. It's just one of those things that makes you go Hmmmmmmmm. Senator Spector never did have the pull to make his $2B project go, but you know, I like the local people more. They're local and somehow they saved $1.5 billion dollars.
Washington Metro will again demonstrate competancy. Silver line will connect the Metro system to Washington's Dulles International Airport. Rumors suggested this line terminates before gettting to the airport. To cut costs. Recently the Washington Post said system critical functions do not work. Well, we will see in July.
Meanwhile, the Metro executive responsible for making this work is resigning. Does he come from where the work gets done? Of course not. Patrick Nowakowski's education is listed as Drexel University - College of Business and Administration. IOW he is a bean counter. A business school graduate doing construction work or operating a mass transit system. We will see what this business school graduate accomplished.
In a previous example, an economics major designed the Obamacare website. Not someone who comes from where the work gets done (ie health care or computer programming). So that was flawed. A new Metro line was constructed by a business school graduate.
A new Metro line was constructed by a business school graduate.
I hear what you are saying, but this guy wasn't out there pumping concrete. He was sitting at his desk and on the phone.
The construction firm completed the line, and it was quite amazing to watch the construction. Metro looked at it and found many minor problems, and a punch list was created. The construction firm worked through the punch list and claims to have completed it. They turned the new line over to Metro for testing. And that's where we are now. Metro needs to do a few months of testing, and then they will open the line to the public.
We'll see in a couple months.
And yes, the line doesn't go all the way to the airport. Metro runs through several jurisdictions, and each jurisdiction needs to come up with funding, including the Feds and each state. The Dulles area (I can't remember which jurisdiction that is, maybe Fairfax County?) didn't want to pay the hundreds of millions of dollars right now to extend the line to the airport, so that part is on hold for now. It's pretty dumb, because extending the line to the airport is the main idea. Now it just goes to some of the neighborhoods on the way to the airport.
It's pretty dumb, because extending the line to the airport is the main idea. Now it just goes to some of the neighborhoods on the way to the airport.
Cab driver lobby? :haha:
"Infrastructure spending is bad" lobby.
Yeah. I agree. That's why I said that we all benefit from roads and that I support having them paid for with taxes.
I'm arguing that public transportation shouldn't be criticized for also being supported partially by taxes.
Except for one thing I want you to think about: it's not
that they are subsidized so much as people thinking they
should be as the natural order of things. Once you think of that, you question whether it is indeed the natural order or mere habit, however longstanding.
Are you talking about roads? Because I think there would be an outcry if you charged a toll for every road.
Apparently something that sounds eerily similar resulted on a subway crash in South Korea last Friday.
Another death on the DC Metro system yesterday.
An electrical arc on the tracks caused a tremendous amount of smoke in a station and surrounding tunnels, and the power loss disabled a train in a nearby tunnel.
Metro's slow response had the train sitting there in a cloud of heavy smoke for about an hour. Poor communication from the train driver to the passengers allowed fear and panic to set in among the passengers, and the smoke and panic caused one woman to have a heart attack and die. Many others were treated for smoke inhalation. Two more are still in serious condition in the hospital.
Pisses me off. One of Metro's biggest weaknesses is an ability to respond quickly to an incident and get information to the passengers. Normally, it's just irritating, but this time a woman died.
I carry a smoke hood to aid in an evacuation. A couple actually.
I've discussed it before here. But my smoke hoods are not designed for sitting on a fucking train for an hour in heavy smoke. They are
evacuation hoods.
Apparently this happens a couple times a month, and the driver followed the proper procedure for a normal electrical arc event, but this one had much more smoke than usual, so the procedure was no longer proper.
The arcing is not uncommon. I've seen it happen in person once. Years ago, we drove right past some arcing and nobody but my wife and I noticed, and we said nothing. All the other passengers either didn't notice it, or assumed the very bright arcing light was just a light in the tunnel. We rode right past and continued on our way as if nothing happened.
There needs to be a balance between training the drivers to behave in a predictable way when confronted with an issue, and throwing the book out the window when they need to make a decision on the ground. Once passengers lose faith in the leaders during an emergency, they take matters into their own hands, like the ones who self evacuated this time before they knew the power was turned off to the third rail. It's fortunate that nobody died doing that. But Metro is to blame for letting the passengers get that panicked.
There wasn't a lot this driver could do on a dead train, but the drivers should be trained in making announcements, even when they don't have any concrete information from Central Control to relay. Something as simple as acknowledging the smoke and suggesting passengers sit on the floor where smoke would be less thick. Reminding the passengers that the tunnel is made of concrete and can't burn. That it's most likely an electrical fire, even if the driver can't see that, they should have the experience to know that. And a reminder that the third rail carries a high current and will fry them if they get off the train before it's turned off. Cover your mouth with a jacket or something and just sit tight until help comes.
You can't make the assumption the driver is rational, logical, or knows anything more than how to drive the train. The liability risk of having drivers make the decision of what/how much, to tell the passengers is huge. Even bigger for instructing them. As for advising them to stay or leave the train, fugetaboutit, just declare bankruptcy.
Your Honor, he said sit on the floor, so I sat on the floor thinking it would be ok. He didn't say we had to do anything else, so I didn't.
translation;
I'm so stupid I have to be reminded to breathe, gimme a million dollars.
I've never been able to understand what the train driver is saying. The sound quality is for shit, and they talk too fast, and I'm not even sure it's English.
Nothing said over a public address system is in English.
Trace your ancestry back to before William the Conquerer (our version of the Mayflower)? You will still be incomprehensible if you a making a platform announcement on the Tube.
Even on a coach - although most of them are driven by miserable Geordies anyway - no-one will understand what you've said. Even if there isn't a noisy woman yapping on her phone. Which there will be.
In all my years of travel/ commuting on the Underground I never felt the need for a smoke hood, or indeed had any occasion to use one. A rolled up newspaper for twatting people about the head would have been more appropriate, had I ever dared use it.
...twatting people about the head...
Hmmm, that doesn't sound completely unpleasant. :blush:
In all my years of travel/ commuting on the Underground I never felt the need for a smoke hood, or indeed had any occasion to use one.
It was actually the London Underground terrorist bombing that made me decide to start carrying a smoke hood. I figured it was only a matter of time before DC got hit.
London, 7/7/05
[ATTACH]50096[/ATTACH]
Had they been accessible (had I been old enough too) during The Troubles I'd have had one. I wasn't mocking. But as the IRA didn't hit the Tube my only concession to Underground travel was always to have water with me.
By the time I was back living in London after the Tube attack I was only ever on tourist routes.
Bombers don't bother with them usually.
I understand. And the odds of trouble are still low anyway.
With this DC incident, It made me wonder how I would deal in the heat of the moment. People were really hurting. Would I put on my mask and just sit there watching others die because they couldn't breathe? Not sure I could live with myself. But then why carry a mask at all? I need to remind myself that I have to keep myself alive for my family. They are counting on me. Put on my mask and let the strangers deal as best they can without one. They could have carried one too, but they chose not to. I'd need to be cold.
Plus, walk out of there with a mask on, and become suspect #1.
A live suspect #1, and hopefully only for a short time, but still.
Yeah, but posting here about it for several years will hopefully exonerate me.
I understand. And the odds of trouble are still low anyway.
With this DC incident, It made me wonder how I would deal in the heat of the moment. People were really hurting. Would I put on my mask and just sit there watching others die because they couldn't breathe?
Of course not. Think man think, wallets, purses, and don't overlook money clips. bra stuffings and lunch money. :lol2:
I've spent the last couple hours trying to find statistics on Metro safety and transportation safety overall. It's not all nice and neatly organized, and I've had to do some ballpark estimating based on the numbers I can find.
The reason I have been thinking about this is that there has been a lot of talk lately about Metro's lack of safety and the need to shut it down to make repairs. The new General Manager is committed to fixing things, but at the same time, the Federal Transit Administration has seized control of safety issues and is throwing its weight around threatening to shut things down if the GM doesn't do things the way they want them done.
Everyone is talking about safety. Meanwhile Metro service has taken a nose dive. The FTA has demanded that trains be slowed way down so they draw less current and there will be less arcing. (Smoke by arcing has caused a death in an asthma sufferer as mentioned in the posts above.)
So anyway, Metro sucks now, and it's about to get a lot worse as they start shutting down tracks to work on them. All in the name of safety.
So let's look at safety.
[ATTACH]56580[/ATTACH]
This chart came from a
2009 FTA report on the years 2003-2008. I annotated it to include the two bars on the far right. Those are my back of the envelope calculations based on easily found data on deaths in Metrorail, and the more difficult to find data on the number and length of trips. But I think my calculations are very close to being accurate.
What it shows is that even in the worst year for Metro, when the accident that kicked this thread off happened, riding metro was twice as safe as commuting by car. (On average) And if you widen the sample size to include the years Metro has been having a bad time, the accident and the asthma death, Metro is about 15 times safer than driving.
So when the FTA talks about shutting down all of Metro for safety, they are full of it. It will make passengers more likely to die on the road. They should leave the GM alone and let him schedule the maintenance in a way that is logical from a logistics and efficiency viewpoint. Metro is safer than they would have you believe.
I never gathered the statistics, but that's been my feeling, too.
If they can use the current situation to actually do maintenance that had been deferred due to the budget, there may be a silver lining, but overall the Metro coverage has made me think of Shark Week.
Look how scary sharks/train accidents are! You should be scared of swimming/Metro!
But what happens as ridership increases? The system has been run by a bunch of appointed politicians who know jackshit about anything but the bottom line. One of the reasons it worked so well for you is they skipped maintenance that would interfere with your trip. But now that
misguided policy has accumulated problems, and the perceived savings will come back with a vengeance.
Yeah. It's been mismanaged. And hasn't been maintained.
Keeping it open so late was probably the final nail in the coffin. When they made that change a few years ago, they basically eliminated all maintenance then, and it rapidly declined.
On a more personal note, Friday is bike to work day. I'm going to try riding my bike in to the office for the first time. I have my route all planned out. I'm on bike paths for the first 5 miles and then once I'm in DC, I have about a dozen blocks to ride on city streets. Half of those streets have little bike lanes on them that are routinely blocked by double parked delivery trucks every block. It will be a test of my possible new commute during the upcoming track shutdown and 80% reduction in capacity on my line. Should take me an extra 15 minutes door to door, but I'll arrived tired and sweaty. I'll need to take a shower here. So I need to allow 30-45 extra minutes. Going home is uphill and will take an extra 30 minutes over my current commute, but no rush to get home and allowing time for a shower there is no big deal.
You're gonna have to learn to fly. :lol: