Washington subway crash

[tw]

Originally Posted by glatt

It makes me wonder about the wisdom of having the trains run by computer and the drivers just there as a back-up.

So that humans can perform their job, roads must be (but not always) designed so that the human can see beyond what is required to stop (which is also why superior cars use orange - not red - rear turn signals). Trains don't do that. Trains are dependent on a signaling system. Therefore the train operator could not stop the train. Train was traveling too fast around a blind corner for the operator to do anything. This is normal on most every railroad.

Blind turns are typically not a problem. Reason why this crash is reported: because train crashes are so close to zero as to be virtually zero. The system works.

And so again, the questions. Why did backup systems fail? For example, one backup system is maintenance people who are empowered to do their job. Why was this train's computer not instructed by track sensors (as latest reports suggest)?

Again, I am going right back to the reason for such failures. How often do you also use the parking brake? Exact same attitude with equal consequences. Deaths and injury created by not applying the parking brake are rarely reported, in part, because it happens.

About six months ago in a nearby town, she got out of the car to get the mail. Car in park started rolling down the driveway. She ran to jump into the car just as the car door hit a tree. She remained there for 45 minutes until someone bothered to look closer. Death directly traceable to someone who did not routinely implement (enable) a backup system. And simply too common to get equal attention.

[tw]

85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management. This crash is a perfect example of management in denial - without any grasp of the problem - without sufficient knowledge to address the problem with all due action - without sufficient attitude to listen to what the employees knew all along. Now the question - what is the education of all top managers in the Washington Metro? They did not even know how bad the system's signalling was?

From the Washington Post of 21 Jul 2009: D.C. Metro Circuit Failures May Be Widespread, Officials Say

Any attempt to selectively quote the more important points would only subvert the entire message in that news report.

[glatt]

Originally Posted by tw

without sufficient attitude to listen to what the employees knew all along

what, specifically, are you talking about here? There is no mention in the article you cited that any employees knew of a problem.

Other news reports have mentioned that warnings came from other transit agencies in the country that they were having similar problems with the same kind of track sensors. But I've seen nothing that says employee warnings went unheeded.

It's true that they don't know what the problem with the one sensor that caused the crash is. They could replace it and move on, but they want to figure it out first. I'm not impressed that it's taken weeks and they still don't know.

[tw]

Originally Posted by glatt

what, specifically, are you talking about here? .

There are no such thing as accidents. We may have another classic example of "85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management."

[tw]

From the Washington Post of 9 Aug 2009:

Metro Safety System Failed in Near Miss Before June Crash
The crash-avoidance system suspected of failing in the recent deadly accident on Metro's Red Line malfunctioned three months earlier, when a rush-hour train on Capitol Hill came "dangerously close" to another train and halted only after the operator hit the emergency brake, newly obtained records show. ...

The National Transportation Safety Board, which is investigating the June 22 crash, learned of the March incident last week when notified by the little-known Tri-State Oversight Committee, said NTSB spokeswoman Bridget Serchak. Metro officials did not immediately respond to questions about why they did not notify the NTSB.

The Washington Post discovered the incident while reviewing documents obtained through a public records request filed with the oversight committee, which was created 12 years ago to monitor Metro. ...

In an April 29 letter ... He said the train "violated a block," meaning it improperly shared a section of track with another train, and "came dangerously close to the leading train." Madison, a planner for the D.C. Transportation Department, wrote that it was only by "coincidence" that a Metro employee later noticed the incident in computer records. ...

After the June crash, Metro officials said that the malfunctioning track circuit at the accident site was "a freak occurrence" and that they were unaware of other incidents, including near misses, that stemmed from failures in the safety system. ...

NTSB says it appears that Metro's control system failed to detect a stopped train and that an approaching one did not receive a command to stop.

That is multiple failures. Similar problems were observed previously when humans averted crashes. Metro spokesmen even denied these problems existed only to learn about them after the Washington Post discovered them. A previous failure was only discovered by coincidence. All imply a serious management problem exists where management does not know how the work gets done. Where employees have the attitude and knowledge provided by management.

Later in the meeting, the panel discussed a June 3 letter in which a Metro worker alleged "that the ATP system was unreliable." Metro declined to comment on the reference.

There is one employee who will find future employment difficult. The problem with being honest when management would rather lie or deny - and then take revenge.

[glatt]

NTSB yesterday announced that it still has no fucking clue what happened, but that there are serious unknown problems with the control system of METRO and probably a handful of other systems in the country. So those systems should be careful.

Thanks guys. That's real helpful. Didn't we know this within the first week?

How are the rail systems supposed to check their shit if you don't tell them what to check for?

It's all moot right now, since the trains are still being manually operated after the crash. The red line still has not been fixed, because in 3 months, they still haven't figured out what is wrong with it to fix.

What the hell? The track circuit is right there. It's not like it was destroyed in the crash. They can duplicate the failure, but don't know what causes the failure? Get some electrical engineers down there, stat.