On Belief, Knowledge, and Justification

[smoothmoniker]

Originally Posted by Beestie

3.1: Agreed. For me, metaphysical is just that part of physical that lies outside the realm of the verifiable. I think that over time, things move from the metaphysical into the physical (metaphysical entropy, if you will) as the opportunity to apply the scientific method avails itself. Its really all about cause and effect. Effects with unknown causes tend to be classified as metaphysical events or, at least, its an easy way to "process" and accept the event. Ultimately, all things become physical at some level since we are not capable of processing much of anything that lacks a physical component. Even Heaven and Hell are reduced to pleasure and pain at some level.

I think we're talking about different things here. I want to limit metaphysical to mean things which, if they exist at all, are necessarily beyond brute phyicalism. The best example would be God - if he exists at all, he is by nature a metaphysical being that cannot be reduced to brute physicalism. I agree that we have historically placed things in the metaphysical category that we would now call physical, but I think it would be better to say that we were mistaken in our category, not that the thing itself changed from being a metaphysical to a physical thing.

3.2: Any justification for believing anything metaphysical lies in the ability of the belief to predict future events or explain current events. My belief that God commands the sun to rise each morning is perfectly justified since he has never failed to make it so (its predictive and explanatory). Now that I understand the sun doesn't really rise at all (the earth spins), the belief is shattered. Therefore, as a more reasonable explanation is provided, beliefs gravitate from the metaphysical to the physical and the realm of the metaphysical is incrementally and irreversably depleted.

I think explanatory power and predictive power are pretty good things to put on the "Justification" list, and I would note that even though you count them toward justification for metaphysical ideas, they are also the two primary axioms for justifying physical ideas, notably scientific hypotheses. We are justified in believing the theory of gravity because it has comprehensive explanatory power of current states of reality, and because it has predictive power for future events.

3.3: No. It all boils down to the success of predictability - the likelihood or frequency that the assumption that the chair is there when you return is proven correct however justified or unjustified the belief that it was there in your absence. I believe that eclipses are God punishing us by withholding "His" light from us (mooning us, if you will). Bob, however thinks that it happens when Thor hurtles his battleax across the heavens and it blocks out the sun for a mintue. We can both justify the event (not enough people in church/forgot to sacrifice a virgin to Thor) but neither of us can predict the next one. When Newton comes along, causality/predictability become known and the metaphysical is diminished. However, there is nothing to say that Newton took into account all variables (as Einstein showed). And it may turn out that Einstein's models are not perfectly predictive. Until all variables are known (one can never be sure that there is not one more unknown variable), the idea of irrefutable predictability remains a goal and not a state. Therefore, validity can never be absolute.

Is this only the case for metaphysical events, or for physical as well? Take my example of the law of gravity - it has a perfect record for predictability. It predicts that any two objects of a certain mass placed within a certain field of each will be attracted, and lo and behold, every single time it's true. Can we say that this justification criterion for predictability reaches the point where we can positively assign the law of gravity to the "true" category?

3.4: That's an odd question. If there was no good reason to believe it was true (lack of explanatory value/ evidence of its falseness and/or no predictive value) then why would anyone believe it was true in the first place? Dogma would appear to be the subject of this question and, therefore, outside the scope of the discussion.

Let me give a for instance. A young girl in an oncology ward is told by her doctors and her parents that she is going to get better, and be completely healthy within a month. She believes this, and as a result, she is happy and content for 4 weeks, right up until the moment when she dies as a result of the cancer that her parents and doctors knew would kill her. She had a justified false belief. Put aside for a moment the ethics of the doctor lying to her, and ask the question, would there have been some benefit to the girl having a justified true belief that she was going to die that was greater than the benefit she derived from her justified untrue belief that she was going to live?

Basically, was it proper for her to exist in category I or category III?

[Schrodinger's Cat]

Just to make sure we are on the same page - as I understand it, you consider "justified" = "true"? You seem to consider that some statements can be more "justified" than others, depending upon the accumulation of evidence either way?

In your philosophy, is there anything which we may accept as "givens" or "material reality" versus a "belief" which may or may not be true?

For example, would you consider the equation

force = mass x acceleration

a "belief" or a "true" statement useful for describing the behavior of objects under the laws of classical physics?

[smoothmoniker]

Originally Posted by Schrodinger's Cat

Just to make sure we are on the same page - as I understand it, you consider "justified" = "true"? You seem to consider that some statements can be more "justified" than others, depending upon the accumulation of evidence either way?

No, I'm not trying to say anything like justified = truth. I'm trying to make a distinction between justification for belief and the fact of the matter, and to say that we can understand them as different evaluative schemes.

This might seem petty, but the reason why I want to make this distinction is so that we can put together a list of things that count toward justification for a belief, about either physical or metaphysical things.

In your philosophy, is there anything which we may accept as "givens" or "material reality" versus a "belief" which may or may not be true?

For example, would you consider the equation

force = mass x acceleration

a "belief" or a "true" statement useful for describing the behavior of objects under the laws of classical physics?

I'm actually going to go a different direction with this than skepticism vs. realism. My answer is going to be skepticism -or- realism. I think the way this fleshes out is this - whether you are a radical skeptic, and say that nothing is verifiable, or you are a realist, and say that our perceptions are trustworthy and that some things can be verifiable, that you have to carry that same perspective through both the physical and the metaphysical.

I'm not trying to dodge the question, and I will take it up later, but for now, I'm more interested in knowing if you thing anything is verifiable, and if so, then what counts toward verification? If nothing is verifiable, then what counts toward justification? In a personal sense, what evidences cause you to say "I know this" or "I believe this to be true"?

[Schrodinger's Cat]

Originally Posted by smoothmoniker

No, I'm not trying to say anything like justified = truth. I'm trying to make a distinction between justification for belief and the fact of the matter, and to say that we can understand them as different evaluative schemes.

This might seem petty, but the reason why I want to make this distinction is so that we can put together a list of things that count toward justification for a belief, about either physical or metaphysical things.

OK, I think I know where you're going with this. See, one problem I have with discussing metaphysics with most people is that they often seem to treat physics (or science) and metaphysics (or religion/faith)as two intersecting sets. Faith needs to stick with the question of god, and science needs to stick to questions which can be answered through application of the scientific method.

Contemporary society runs into more problems when some ill-informed group tries to either prove or disprove god through science or, conversely, tries to use god to disprove science.

I feel equally annoyed when a fundamentalist makes some statement like "God created the fossils" or an atheist says science has shown that the universe has an infinite existance, therefore, god does not exist. You simply can't use two such different modes of understanding to explain each other.

Do you share this premise of mine?

Originally Posted by smoothmoniker

I'm actually going to go a different direction with this than skepticism vs. realism. My answer is going to be skepticism -or- realism. I think the way this fleshes out is this - whether you are a radical skeptic, and say that nothing is verifiable, or you are a realist, and say that our perceptions are trustworthy and that some things can be verifiable, that you have to carry that same perspective through both the physical and the metaphysical.

I'm not trying to dodge the question, and I will take it up later, but for now, I'm more interested in knowing if you thing anything is verifiable, and if so, then what counts toward verification? If nothing is verifiable, then what counts toward justification? In a personal sense, what evidences cause you to say "I know this" or "I believe this to be true"?

Yes, I know that certain things are verifiable. We can get into the whole question of well, maybe I'm a certified schizophrenic; or maybe you are; or maybe you and I are the only ones who can trust our senses, and everyone ELSE is a certified schizophrenic. This reasoning has its adherants, but, personally, I find it to be a tiresome argument where little of substance ever seems to derive from discussions which have this premise.

My 5 basic animal senses of touch, hearing, sight, etc. usually serve me well enough to verify the reality of things that I encounter in my daily life.

If my senses cannot detect the thing itself, the senses are often able to detect phenomena which arise as a result of that thing's existance. For example, up here in north Idaho, we can't see the air, but we can feel it when the wind blows. I understand that people in LA, however, can actually see the "air" on a smoggy day.

If I can't personally sense a thing either directly or indirectly, I am willing to accept that thing's validity from the reports of other people - depending. If 20 members from the cult outside of town all drop acid together and show up on my doorstep proclaiming that they have seen god or seen a pink elephant with purple stripes, I am unlikely to accept their statement as valid.

If my best friend who has never told a lie in his life or ever touched a mind altering substance, tells me about the pink elephant, I will feel concerned for his mental well-being. If, in addition, to my best friend's report, the head of the biology department also claims the animal to be in existance, I'll check my calendar to see if its April Fool's. If the pink elephant reports continue to come in over time and from a variety of sources, I'll begin to think that perhaps such an animal does indeed exist.

As for the existance of Undertoad, for all I know, you made him up, along with also making up people who claim to have actually seen him. I think it rather unlikely that you would go to such an elaborate ploy, but I suppose it's possible.

[Beestie]

Originally Posted by smoothmoniker

I think we're talking about different things here. I want to limit metaphysical to mean things which, if they exist at all, are necessarily beyond brute phyicalism.

I agree with your point that categorical error is what places certain events in the realm of the metaphysical when they really never belonged there. My real question, therefore, is how can we really be sure what does and doesn't belong there. How can we differentiate between categorical error and the truly metaphysical? The ancients were not aware of their error and although we are more enlightened, I'm pretty sure we are making some errors as well. If you want to only include those things for which error is unthinkable (God, for example), then justification is limited to the lack of a physical cause. These justifications are nasty because they are obviously difficult to refute using anything other than a seperate metaphysical explanation landing one in a "my construct can beat up your construct" zone. The idea that I introduced of metaphysical entropy - the idea that one day there will be nothing left for which there is not a physical cause implies that some metaphysical concepts will be shown to be physical concepts as our knowledge increases while other metaphysical objects/ideas will simply cease to exist until the metaphysical lexicon is void.

I think explanatory power and predictive power are pretty good things to put on the "Justification" list, ... We are justified in believing the theory of gravity because it has comprehensive explanatory power of current states of reality, and because it has predictive power for future events.

Is this only the case for metaphysical events, or for physical as well?... Can we say that this justification criterion for predictability reaches the point where we can positively assign the law of gravity to the "true" category?

Well, Newton's laws work fine until one starts to accellerate to around 20% of the speed of light then Einstein's equations become more accurate explainers of the way things act. So gravity, once thought absolute suddenly becomes elastic as other variables enter the fray. My point is that one cannot know with certainty that all the variables are accounted for until they assert themselves and become known. So the definition of true becomes that which has not yet been proven false. And there is no justification possible for asserting that a thing cannot be proven false since the fact that it hasn't already been proven false is evidence that the thing capable of proving it false has not yet come into being in the realm of whatever phenomenon is being explained. Hence all justification of events physical and metaphysical remains vulnerable to the unknown and since the unknown(s) cannot be quantified, the degree of vulnerability of any given justified truth can never be established.

The best definition of truth I ever encountered was "that upon which we all agree." Unfortunately, I can't recall who said it. But, its true

Let me give a for instance. A young girl in an oncology ward is told by her doctors and her parents that she is going to get better ... She believes this ... until the moment when she dies. She had a justified false belief. ... ask the question, would there have been some benefit to the girl having a justified true belief that she was going to die that was greater than the benefit she derived from her justified untrue belief that she was going to live? Basically, was it proper for her to exist in category I or category III?

Take the for instance that the young lady was a devout Christian. Since she did not know of her impending death, she was denied the opportunity to reconcile with her God, repent, receive final absolution, tell her loved ones how much they meant to her, do some final good deeds, etc., etc., etc. I'm not comfortable speculating on behalf of another which quadrant is proper.

[smoothmoniker]

Originally Posted by Beestie

My real question, therefore, is how can we really be sure what does and doesn't belong there. How can we differentiate between categorical error and the truly metaphysical? ... If you want to only include those things for which error is unthinkable (God, for example), then justification is limited to the lack of a physical cause.

I want to limit the metaphysical to exactly that ... those things which, if they exist at all, can by definition only exist as metaphysical entities. God is one example. Universal moral laws are another. They may not exist, but if they do, then by definition, they exist as something other than the result of physical causation. There was no chemical reaction that caused universal moral laws, if they exist by that definition.

We might say "Well, these things we call moral laws are the result of chemical reactions in the collective brains of a society, and are therefore physical and not metaphysical." This might be true, but if it is, then what we are really saying is that universal moral laws do not exist as such, and only appear to exist. Catch what I'm saying? For something to be a metaphysical concepts, it has to be by nature metaphysical. If it is demonstrated to be the result of physical causation, we cannot say that it has "become" physical, we must say that is does not exist. Some new thing may be said to exist, the physical thing, but the initial thing must be said to have never really existed.

[russotto]

Originally Posted by smoothmoniker

I want to limit the metaphysical to exactly that ... those things which, if they exist at all, can by definition only exist as metaphysical entities. God is one example.

Certainly not; God in most religions has a quite physical existance.

We might say "Well, these things we call moral laws are the result of chemical reactions in the collective brains of a society, and are therefore physical and not metaphysical." This might be true, but if it is, then what we are really saying is that universal moral laws do not exist as such, and only appear to exist.

What that is saying is that universal moral laws are an emergent phenomenon. Which I'd claim is metaphysical.