The real cost of IRAQ: PTSD and the second war

[Undertoad]

Originally Posted by richlevy

Doesn't it give you pause to think that he was our ally at one time? As were Marcos, Hussein, and a number of other thugs. We build them up, equip them, and then make it some poor shmucks job to go in there and clean it up.

Like the nature of this very thread, don't let reality get in the way of the little fairy tales in your head, Rich.

[xoxoxoBruce]

was not suffering post-traumatic stress disorder,

While the rest may be true you can't say he wasn't stressed. Motor transport unit? Aren't they the ones getting blown up all over the place, especially the fuel tanker drivers?

[richlevy]

Originally Posted by richlevy
Doesn't it give you pause to think that he was our ally at one time? As were Marcos, Hussein, and a number of other thugs. We build them up, equip them, and then make it some poor shmucks job to go in there and clean it up.

Originally Posted by Undertoad

Like the nature of this very thread, don't let reality get in the way of the little fairy tales in your head, Rich.

So which part of my 'reality' are you challenging?

Marcos ,

Given its past colonial association and continued security and economic interests in the Philippines, the United States never was a disinterested party in Philippine politics. On June 1, 1983, the United States and the Philippines signed a five-year memorandum of agreement on United States bases, which committed the United States administration to make "best efforts" to secure US$900 million in economic and military aid for the Philippines between 1984 and 1988. The agreement reflected both United States security concerns at a time of increased Soviet-Western tension in the Pacific and its continued faith in the Marcos regime.

Hussein

Shaking Hands: Iraqi President Saddam Hussein greets Donald Rumsfeld, then special envoy of President Ronald Reagan, in Baghdad on December 20, 1983.

or Stalin?

[Undertoad]

We were Stalin's ally. We weren't Marcos' ally. We weren't Hussein's ally. We didn't build any of them up, we barely equipped them at all, and we didn't say it was some other poor schmuck's job to clean it up. So I guess I'm calling you out on about 90% of your statement.

Ooh again the Rummy-Hussein picture. Do tell us what that's supposed to be proof of.

[xoxoxoBruce]

We weren't Marcos' ally.

From Wikipedia

In support for the U.S. military efforts in South Vietnam, he agreed to send Filipino troops to that war zone. Throughout his 20-year tenure, Marcos maintained a close alliance with the United States and was a close friend of Richard Nixon as well as Ronald Reagan and Lyndon Johnson.

Sounds like an ally to me.

[xoxoxoBruce]

We weren't Hussein's ally.

From The National Security Archive

The U.S. restored formal relations with Iraq in November 1984, but the U.S. had begun, several years earlier, to provide it with intelligence and military support (in secret and contrary to this country's official neutrality) in accordance with policy directives from President Ronald Reagan. These were prepared pursuant to his March 1982 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 4-82) asking for a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

One of these directives from Reagan, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 99, signed on July 12, 1983, is available only in a highly redacted version [Document 21]. It reviews U.S. regional interests in the Middle East and South Asia, and U.S. objectives, including peace between Israel and the Arabs, resolution of other regional conflicts, and economic and military improvements, "to strengthen regional stability." It deals with threats to the U.S., strategic planning, cooperation with other countries, including the Arab states, and plans for action. An interdepartmental review of the implications of shifting policy in favor of Iraq was conducted following promulgation of the directive.

What was the Reagan administration's response? A State Department account indicates that the administration had decided to limit its "efforts against the Iraqi CW program to close monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf war, the sensitivity of sources, and the low probability of achieving desired results." But the department noted in late November 1983 that "with the essential assistance of foreign firms, Iraq ha[d] become able to deploy and use CW and probably has built up large reserves of CW for further use. Given its desperation to end the war, Iraq may again use lethal or incapacitating CW, particularly if Iran threatens to break through Iraqi lines in a large-scale attack" [Document 25]. The State Department argued that the U.S. needed to respond in some way to maintain the credibility of its official opposition to chemical warfare, and recommended that the National Security Council discuss the issue.

Following further high-level policy review, Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114, dated November 26, 1983, concerned specifically with U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The directive reflects the administration's priorities: it calls for heightened regional military cooperation to defend oil facilities, and measures to improve U.S. military capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and directs the secretaries of state and defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take appropriate measures to respond to tensions in the area. It states, "Because of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic." It does not mention chemical weapons [Document 26].

Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, and the two agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests." Rumsfeld affirmed the Reagan administration's "willingness to do more" regarding the Iran-Iraq war, but "made clear that our efforts to assist were inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for us, citing the use of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights." He then moved on to other U.S. concerns [Document 32]. Later, Rumsfeld was assured by the U.S. interests section that Iraq's leadership had been "extremely pleased" with the visit, and that "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person" [Document 36 and Document 37].

Rumsfeld returned to Baghdad in late March 1984. By this time, the U.S. had publicly condemned Iraq's chemical weapons use, stating, "The United States has concluded that the available evidence substantiates Iran's charges that Iraq used chemical weapons" [Document 47]. Briefings for Rumsfeld's meetings noted that atmospherics in Iraq had deteriorated since his December visit because of Iraqi military reverses and because "bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5 condemnation of Iraq for CW use, despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or later" [Document 48]. Rumsfeld was to discuss with Iraqi officials the Reagan administration's hope that it could obtain Export-Import Bank credits for Iraq, the Aqaba pipeline, and its vigorous efforts to cut off arms exports to Iran. According to an affidavit prepared by one of Rumsfeld's companions during his Mideast travels, former NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Rumsfeld also conveyed to Iraq an offer from Israel to provide assistance, which was rejected [Document 61].

Although official U.S. policy still barred the export of U.S. military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently provided on a "don't ask - don't tell" basis. In April 1984, the Baghdad interests section asked to be kept apprised of Bell Helicopter Textron's negotiations to sell helicopters to Iraq, which were not to be "in any way configured for military use" [Document 55]. The purchaser was the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. In December 1982, Bell Textron's Italian subsidiary had informed the U.S. embassy in Rome that it turned down a request from Iraq to militarize recently purchased Hughes helicopters. An allied government, South Korea, informed the State Department that it had received a similar request in June 1983 (when a congressional aide asked in March 1983 whether heavy trucks recently sold to Iraq were intended for military purposes, a State Department official replied "we presumed that this was Iraq's intention, and had not asked.") [Document 44]

Iran had submitted a draft resolution asking the U.N. to condemn Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. delegate to the U.N. was instructed to lobby friendly delegations in order to obtain a general motion of "no decision" on the resolution. If this was not achievable, the U.S. delegate was to abstain on the issue. Iraq's ambassador met with the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, and asked for "restraint" in responding to the issue - as did the representatives of both France and Britain.

A senior U.N. official who had participated in a fact-finding mission to investigate Iran's complaint commented "Iranians may well decide to manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves if [the] international community does not condemn Iraq. He said Iranian assembly speaker Rafsanjani [had] made public statements to this effect" [Document 50].

Iraqi interests section head Nizar Hamdoon met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke on March 29. Hamdoon said that Iraq strongly preferred a Security Council presidential statement to a resolution, and wanted the response to refer to former resolutions on the war, progress toward ending the conflict, but to not identify any specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use. Placke said the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals if the Security Council went along. He asked for the Iraqi government's help "in avoiding . . . embarrassing situation[s]" but also noted that the U.S. did "not want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship" [Document 54].

[Undertoad]

"Ally" specifies something very different than somebody said in diplomacy that we were good buddies.

We looked the other way at Hussein for a few years while it was useful... period. The world was a very different place at the time when the major threat was the nuclear missiles aimed at our cities. And STILL we did not ally, we did sell tons of arms to Hussein (he was mostly armed by France and Russia), we did not ask others to take responsibility for what we had done.

I just want Rich to get the narrative right and not just spit out completely inaccurate, un-American statements for what appears to be the fun of it. The US has fucked up early and often but let's get the story right. It's important.

[Schrodinger's Cat]

Ally - 1. One that is allied with another, especially by treaty: entered the war as an ally of France. 2. One in helpful association with another: legislators who are allies on most issues.

As Ayotallah Khomenei’s Islamic Revolution took hold in Iran, the United States saw Teheran as its main adversary in the Middle East, as did Iraq. Consequently, with huge levels of American support–over $40 billion in weapons and technology through the 1980s, with many transactions “off book”–Iraq fought against Iran for nearly a decade. In the latter stages of battle, eventually won by Iraq, U.S. officers provided intelligence and tactical advice to the Iraqis, all the while Baghdad was using chemical and biological weapons on the battlefield to suppress the Iranians.
http://hnn.us/articles/1066.html

•James Baker received an SD memo stating that Iraq was diligently developing chemical, biological, and new missiles, and that Baker was to "express our interest in broadening U.S.-Iraqi ties" to Iraqi Under-Secretary Hamdoon.

•Although the CIA and the Bush (Senior) Administration knew that Iraq’s Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) "controlled entities were involved in Iraq's clandestine nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and missile programs ... the Bush administration [approved] dozens of export licenses that [allowed] United States and foreign firms to ship sophisticated U.S. dual-use equipment to MIMI-controlled weapons factories".

•By October 1989, when all international banks had cut off loans to Iraq, President Bush signed National Security Directive (NSD) 26 mandating closer links with Iraq and $1 billion in agricultural loan guarantees.

•According to the Washington Post, the CIA began in 1984 secretly to give Iraq intelligence that Iraq uses to "calibrate" its mustard gas attacks on Iranian troops. In August, the CIA establishes a direct Washington-Baghdad intelligence link, and for 18 months, starting in early 1985, the CIA provided Iraq with "data from sensitive U.S. satellite reconnaissance photography...to assist Iraqi bombing raids." The Post’s source said that this data was essential to Iraq’s war effort.

•Later in the year the Reagan Administration secretly began to allow Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt to transfer to Iraq U.S. howitzers, helicopters, bombs and other weapons. Reagan personally asked Italy’s Prime Minister Guilio Andreotti to channel arms to Iraq http://www.casi.org.uk/info/usdocs/usiraq80s90s.html

The United States re-established full diplomatic ties with Iraq on 26 November 1984.


Sounds like an ally to me.

[Undertoad]

Sounds like peanuts to me, on the global scale.

[Happy Monkey]

So we were allies on a local scale, but not a global scale?

[Schrodinger's Cat]

Originally Posted by Undertoad

Sounds like peanuts to me, on the global scale.

40 BILLION smackers?
howitzers, helicopters, bombs and other weapons?
Data for 18 months thru a Washington-Baghdad intelligence link which was used to calibrate mustard gas attacks and was essential to Iraq's war effort against Iran?

If that's "peanuts," I'd like to see the elephant!

[Undertoad]

[Schrodinger's Cat]

Uhmm, these transactions were secret and later revealed by an individual to the Washington Post which managed to get its hands on the supporting documents from various government sources (check the last link in my post 3 back).

Graphs created by "Dissident Frogman" and "Admiral Quixote" have as much credibility as a paper on physics written by "Schrodinger's Cat."

[richlevy]

So just a little bit pregnant? One figure is 200 million dollars worth of weapons in 1990. That's enough conventional weapons to arm a division, or to make tens of thousands of improvised explosive devices.

Were we the best of friends? Maybe not. Were we providing material support? Yes.

[tw]

Originally Posted by Undertoad

Sounds like peanuts to me, on the global scale.

We limit our satellite photographs to only the closest of friends. This even moreso in the 1980s. We routinely provided Saddam with satellite photography in his war with Iran. That comes about as close to 'ally' as could be. Satellite photos are were about as sensitive as anything the US intelligence community can provide anyone. It is only provided to allies. Saddam was provided with satellite photos.