Is one human life worth more than another?

[morethanpretty]

All human life is worthless except in its service to


Only

can decide a human's worth

[sean]

Originally Posted by Master Cthulhu

Is one human life worth more than another?

I think this is one of the questions of life, and after a while of thought on the subject I cannot come up with a conclusion.

What do you think?

I think this question needs to be contextualized. Are we talking in abstract terms or concrete? Is one life worth more than another to a particular person? Of course. Can one life be valued over another as a general principle? No.

Originally Posted by glatt

Yes. My life and the lives of my family and friends are worth more than the lives of complete strangers. Especially strangers who don't hold critical roles in society.

This response from glatt is the intuitive one that occurs to most people, but if we are treating this as a problem of ethics rather than economics I think I agree with the philosopher Peter Singer.

Singer establishes what he calls an 'expanding circle of empathy' as one of the defining elements of human nature. It is natural to care for family, especially immediate family, and the evolutionary underpinnings of this behaviour are obvious. Similarly it's natural to favour compatriots and people with similar ethnic background over aliens, strangers and foreigners. We can easily observe the natural occurrence of xenophobia as well.

But what marks human nature as distinct from other species is progress from instinctive self interest to egalitarian universalism and the ability to feel the discomfort of strangers, of other races, and at some point, of other species. These ideas aren't completely novel, and most Buddhists would recognize them, but Singer has developed them in a rigorous way into a coherent ethical system.

Intuitively, most people judge negatively a person who deprives his or her own children in order to help others. This has actually been established in a number of surveys. But Singer asks quite reasonably, how can parents justify spending more on toys for their children than many families have to spend on the essentials of life? He makes a clear argument that this is unethical.

In other words, he says, it is unethical to value one's own children so much more highly than those of strangers.

I think it's also worth considering what it is that glatt might consider a 'critical role in society'. Would that be the emergency care specialist that revives him after his heart attack? Or the gangsta rapper I'm listening to on my iPod?

Valuing people according to their role in society raises an interesting question about what kind of society we're talking about. Many western cultures have modeled themselves on imperial Rome, a violent, philistine, stratified, slave owning, misogynistic dictatorship. At the same time, we've all observed with mild curiosity the rapid extinction of a wondrous variety of pre-industrial cultures scattered across the globe that, often as not, reflect values of gentleness and communal harmony that Western culture is unlikely to ever be able to comprehend, let alone aspire to.

On top of all this, I think the first question to ask about how we value others is, how do we value ourselves?

[TheMercenary]

Originally Posted by sean

I think this question needs to be contextualized. Are we talking in abstract terms or concrete? Is one life worth more than another to a particular person? Of course. Can one life be valued over another as a general principle? No.



This response from glatt is the intuitive one that occurs to most people, but if we are treating this as a problem of ethics rather than economics I think I agree with the philosopher Peter Singer.

Singer establishes what he calls an 'expanding circle of empathy' as one of the defining elements of human nature. It is natural to care for family, especially immediate family, and the evolutionary underpinnings of this behaviour are obvious. Similarly it's natural to favour compatriots and people with similar ethnic background over aliens, strangers and foreigners. We can easily observe the natural occurrence of xenophobia as well.

But what marks human nature as distinct from other species is progress from instinctive self interest to egalitarian universalism and the ability to feel the discomfort of strangers, of other races, and at some point, of other species. These ideas aren't completely novel, and most Buddhists would recognize them, but Singer has developed them in a rigorous way into a coherent ethical system.

Intuitively, most people judge negatively a person who deprives his or her own children in order to help others. This has actually been established in a number of surveys. But Singer asks quite reasonably, how can parents justify spending more on toys for their children than many families have to spend on the essentials of life? He makes a clear argument that this is unethical.

In other words, he says, it is unethical to value one's own children so much more highly than those of strangers.

I think it's also worth considering what it is that glatt might consider a 'critical role in society'. Would that be the emergency care specialist that revives him after his heart attack? Or the gangsta rapper I'm listening to on my iPod?

Valuing people according to their role in society raises an interesting question about what kind of society we're talking about. Many western cultures have modeled themselves on imperial Rome, a violent, philistine, stratified, slave owning, misogynistic dictatorship. At the same time, we've all observed with mild curiosity the rapid extinction of a wondrous variety of pre-industrial cultures scattered across the globe that, often as not, reflect values of gentleness and communal harmony that Western culture is unlikely to ever be able to comprehend, let alone aspire to.

On top of all this, I think the first question to ask about how we value others is, how do we value ourselves?

So how does this all change when you have sexual feelings for little kids? Because you have already admitted to that much, correct? http://www.cellar.org/showpost.php?p...&postcount=136

[sean]

Originally Posted by TheMercenary

So how does this all change when you have sexual feelings for little kids? Because you have already admitted to that much, correct?

It doesn't change. Would you like to suggest why it would?

Actually, I have some questions for you Mercenary?

Are you homophobic? If so, well, thats pretty much all I need to know.

If not, can you tell me why a kid in a redneck town would expose himself to stigma and violence by choosing to be attracted to men?

Also, could you tell me the difference between volition and experience, or an emotion and an act?

[TheMercenary]

Originally Posted by sean

It doesn't change. Would you like to suggest why it would?

No. I was more interested in your thoughts. But you say it is no different if you are a pedophile. I accept that. You should know better than me, that is why I asked.

[sean]

Originally Posted by TheMercenary

No. I was more interested in your thoughts. But you say it is no different if you are a pedophile. I accept that. You should know better than me, that is why I asked.

I've already revealed quite a bit about my thoughts. I thought it was fairly obvious that I think a paedophile has no less intrinsic value than anybody else. Did you see my other questions?

Originally Posted by smoothmoniker

Oh god. And THAT'S pretty much all I need to know.

Care to elaborate?

[smoothmoniker]

Originally Posted by sean

I think I agree with the philosopher Peter Singer.

Oh god. And THAT'S pretty much all I need to know.

[smoothmoniker]

Among the many, many problems I have with Singer, he thinks that children younger than 2 and the mentally handicapped and have no inherent value, and can be killed for any reason, including the simple convenience of the caregiver.

Singer is the living reductio ad absurdum of utilitarianism.

[sean]

Originally Posted by smoothmoniker

Among the many, many problems I have with Singer, he thinks that children younger than 2 and the mentally handicapped and have no inherent value, and can be killed for any reason, including the simple convenience of the caregiver.

Singer is the living reductio ad absurdum of utilitarianism.

Well maybe reductio ad absurdum is part of his argument.

Its all very well to grumble at the uncompromising nature of some consequentialist conclusions, but unless you can provide coherent alternatives, you're stuck on the same path.

So what are those alternatives? Something from outer space? Tablets of stone?

[smoothmoniker]

Originally Posted by sean

Well maybe reductio ad absurdum is part of his argument.

I have no idea what that might mean.

[sean]

Originally Posted by smoothmoniker

I have no idea what that might mean.

It means that Singer the man is not identical with Singer the philosopher. As you pointed out in your other post.

And you still haven't suggested any rational basis for an ethics besides the consequences of acts.

[sean]

Originally Posted by smoothmoniker

Among the many, many problems I have with Singer, he thinks that children younger than 2 and the mentally handicapped and have no inherent value, and can be killed for any reason, including the simple convenience of the caregiver.

When Singer says it is the refusal to accept killing that, in some cases, is horrific (Practical Ethics, 2nd edition, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 175-217), he makes it clear that his views on killing are not the unfeeling triumph of unconstrained self interest, but an argument about how to do the best by people.

What he is saying is that dogmatic adherence to a doctrine on the sanctity of life is not guaranteed to lead to the best moral outcome. Representing this as the nullification of the rights of vulnerable individuals seems misleading at best.

I once allowed some people to search for the victim of an avalanche. He was dead anyway, but even if he had been alive, I made the wrong decision. I should have left him, because I put the lives of the searchers at risk. That's a situation where the 'sanctity of life' fails as an absolute principle. There are plenty more.

Originally Posted by smoothmoniker

Singer is the living reductio ad absurdum of utilitarianism.

I commented that maybe that was part of his argument because I think thats how utilitarianism plays out sometimes. The world is full of ethical vegetarians who have reluctantly become so through introspection and analysis. If that isn't an absurdity in the species with the most lethal bite of any mammal, then what is?

[smoothmoniker]

Utilitarianism isn't coherent. It's an absolutely untenable ethical system.

Singer himself doesn't come anywhere close to following the harsh edicts he so cavalierly decrees. He lives on far more than $30,000 a year (he states that unless you donate any income above that to alleviate hunger, you are committing murder), and he didn't manage to put a pillow over his mother's face, even after she had descended into Alzheimer's to the point where she was "no longer a person".

Singer is a joke.

[smoothmoniker]

Sorry man, I don't have the time or the inclination to spew undergrad intro to philosophy notes back and forth.

Singer and others of his ilk get the question wrong. They want to drag a modernist theory of knowledge along with them into a post-modern world, and it just won't work. Ethics isn't rationally derivable from first principles.

Consequentialist Ethics are concerned with an abstract calculus that can be applied universally to all possible acts-of-a-kind. The world doesn't actually work like that, which is why Singer and others don't bother actually trying to LIVE the extreme positions they argue for. What is called for instead is moral wisdom, or virtue.

Put down the Singer (unless, of course, you need to study up for the midterm) and pick up some Alasdair MacIntyre instead. You'll find it a much better reflection of how human beings actually live and move and breathe as moral beings.

[sean]

Originally Posted by TheMercenary

So how does this all change when you have sexual feelings for little kids?

Originally Posted by smoothmoniker

Put down the Singer ... and pick up some Alasdair MacIntyre instead.

Despite my quoting Singer, I'm not inclined to dismiss MacIntyre's Aristotelianism. I think the concept of a tradition of virtue, and of categories of living that reflect character and a moral attitude are quite valid.

As I've said, I situate an ethological formulation of instinctive empathy as primary in ethical decision making (a kind of emotivism). Subsequent to it, I invoke a consequentialist argument to explain how we come by an objective understanding of harm.

I despise religion in all its manifestations*, so my formulation of 'virtue' also tends to follow a naturalistic, anti-authoritarian and existential path that champions personal responsibility over mass chanting in unison. Of the theological virtues -faith, hope and charity- only charity acquires a positive evaluation in my ethical schema, and its co-opting as a characteristic virtue by religious traditions seems to me a baseless self promotion.

But there is definitely room for some crossover between my position and MacIntyre's.

For me, being attracted to children isn't a moral problem, it is a simple fact. Where I think MacIntyre might have something useful to contribute (and I intend to read some of his work) is in that the primary moral problem faced by paedophiles is the apparent absence of any clear tradition of right action that addresses their own particular needs. In MacIntyre's terms, there is no narrative tradition of paedophilia that enables virtue.

In truth there is. That tradition is well established, but it has been driven underground and all but destroyed by the wave of persecution over recent decades. I think it's important to rehabilitate it. There is a rich tradition to draw on, a tradition of paedophiles who are 'great souls' and are not 'moral monsters', and who have written movingly about their lives and experiences.

In these difficult times, I think it takes some courage (not merely daring) to assert the potential for good in paedophiles, so I'm going to give myself a pat on the back just for suggesting it.

*Just want to add, I'm sorry about any offense this statement causes. I realise it's unfair and unreasonable. I know religion is important to many people, including some people I care about. I'm leaving it in as a declaration of bias.