The Immaterial Mind

[henry quirk]

"...is such a thing as a 'soul' or whatever you want to call it(?)"

not likely: at least not likely in the sense of an 'indwelling spirit'

as i self-inspect: i see no evidence of duality...no soul/body or mind/body or brain/body division

what i perceive is 'me' as a whole, as a unit, as separate and discrete from all of you; and as irreducible to parts and process and, therefore, indescribable by way of parts and process

certainly: i'm comprised of pieces, parts, and process but these parts, pieces, and processes fall 'beneath' me, fall 'within' me

the examination of parts and process can tell the inquisitive a lot about 'the flesh' but next to nothing about 'me'

to know about 'me' i must be inspected, interrogated, as 'myself'

so: i am not my brain, but my brain -- as locus for intellect and consciousness -- is a very important part of me

in the same vein: i don't have memories...i remember; i don't have a free will...i choose; etc.


"...there may be a non-material element to our minds, it's certainly very hard to account for consciousness without it"

i'm not sure i buy this, but, really: what bearing does it have on anything?

if i'm an embodied soul...so what?

if i'm a cobbled-together bio-machine...so what?

if i'm something else (mundane or supranatural) entirely...so what?

none of the above possibilities (or any others) have any real bearing on how i choose to comport myself in the world

if scientists, tomorrow, prove without a doubt that i'm just a bio-machine with no special relevance in the world, i should do 'what' because of this information?

i can't imagine such information having any effect on my life...my own, subjective, self-definition as 'henry quirk' trumps all objective definitions... --henry