Quake/Tsunami

[tw]

From the NY Times on 17 May 2011 is what happens when executives do not make decisions:

In Japan Reactor Failings, Danger Signs for the U.S.
Government officials have also suggested that one of the primary causes of the explosions was a several-hour delay in a decision to use the vents, as Tokyo Electric managers agonized over whether to resort to emergency measures that would allow a substantial amount of radioactive materials to escape into the air. ...

The seriousness of the crisis at the Fukushima plant became evident within hours of the quake and the tsunami that rushed over the plant's sea wall.

Just 12 hours after the quake, the pressure inside Reactor No. 1 had reached roughly twice the maximum pressure the unit had been designed to withstand, raising fears that the vessels that house fuel rods would rupture, setting a possible meltdown in motion. With the pressure high, pumping in additional cooling water also was not possible

The government became rattled enough that it ordered Tokyo Electric to begin venting. But even then, Tokyo Electric's executives continued to deliberate, according to a person close to government efforts to bring the reactors under control. The exchanges became so heated, the person said, that the company's nuclear chief, Vice President Sakae Muto, and the stricken plant's director, Masao Yoshida, engaged in a "shouting match" - a rarity in reserved Japan.

Mr. Yoshida wanted to vent as soon as possible, but Mr. Muto was skeptical whether venting would work, ... The executives did not give the order to begin venting until Saturday - more than 17 hours after the tsunami struck and 6 hours after the government order to vent. ...

Had they vented then, batteries still would have provided electricity. By stalling, the vents no longer had electric power to operate.

The valves are designed so they can also be opened manually, but by that time, workers found radiation levels near the venting system at Reactor No. 1 were already too high to approach, according to Tokyo Electric's records. ...

The results of the failed venting were disastrous.

Reactor No. 1 exploded first, on Saturday, the day after the earthquake. Reactor No. 3 came next, on Monday. And No. 2 exploded early Tuesday morning. ...

Tokyo Electric in recent days has acknowledged that damage at the plant was worse than previously thought, with fuel rods most likely melting completely at Reactors 1, 2 and 3 in the early hours of the crisis, ...

Well duhhhh. Obvious by the end of the first week. Pressure was twice what the reactor vessel was supposed to withstand. And still top management could not permit what plant managers knew had to be done ASAP. How many employees did the Vice President plan on killing? Or could he not even make that decision?