Autopsy of a Near Disaster (2003)

[tw]

Posted back in 2003 in

For example, Ted Koppel accurately provided important details of that repelled Apache attack when he said every Apache suffered damage. This was confirmed by newspaper stories of how badly each chopper was hit - some having to eject their guns that had even caught fire. A fact they says thery are all lucky to be alive. Chopper crews got out and all hugged each other. That is how badly mauled those Apaches suffered. As Koppel then noted, 3rd Army would have to change tactics. What worked in the Gulf War no longer works in Iraq. The enemy learned. Perspective.

What resulted was a complete rewrite of Army operations and canceling of future weapons contracts. Ted got it completely correct in 2003 when the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment was almost destroyed. From the San Antonio Express-News on Mar 2004:

The Boeing helicopters, the most advanced in the U.S. inventory, ... were turned back by a barrage of low-tech ground fire. The failed raid led the Army to change the way Apaches will be used in future conflicts. Instead of training for strikes deep behind enemy lines, Apache pilots now get drilled more for close-air support of ground troops, and for fighting in urban settings.

New training also stresses more coordination with Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fighter jets and aerial drones. Such coordination was lacking in the Karbala raid. Army aviators are now being taught speed and maneuverability, lessons dusted off from the Vietnam era, when choppers also faced a substantial threat from small-arms fire.

On the night of the failed Karbala raid, the Apache crews intended to destroy one of Saddam Hussein's best units, the Republican Guard Medina Division, and to clear a path for the Army's lead ground unit - the 3rd Infantry Division. ...

Shortly after leaving their base, the Apaches, ... were ambushed in a blizzard of gunfire and anti-aircraft flak. The pilots ... halted their advance and pulled into a hover to return fire. After all 30 Apaches had been raked by Iraqi fire, they broke off the fight and limped back to their desert base. One chopper was forced down, and its pilots ... were held captive for three weeks.

Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, a retired commander from Gulf War I, said the failed attack "was nearly a modern day 'Charge of the Light Brigade,'... The Congressional Research Service, an investigative branch of Congress that conducted an assessment of last year's U.S. invasion, concluded Apache forces that night had come perilously close to "a near disaster."

After the failed raid, Army officials junked plans for most Apache deep-attack missions and instead emphasized armed reconnaissance and close-air support for ground troops. ...

The new tactics were on full display the night of the raid when the ambushers focused their fire at the exposed flanks and rear of the aircraft, forcing them to pull into a hover so they could find their attackers on the ground and return fire. But the hover mode made the Apaches potentially more vulnerable. ...

The experience of the Karbala raid loomed large last month when Army leaders terminated the $38 billion Comanche helicopter project. The Comanche was supposed to function alongside the Apache as a deep-strike attacker.

Some estimated that most of 31 choppers were lucky to have survived having retreated before total disaster occurred. Apache pilots were trained as if their aircraft were armored tanks. Now it is apparent that even the Apache is very dependent on the best airframe in the US inventory: A-10 Warthog.