Quote:
Originally Posted by Cyber Wolf
In case I missed it somewhere... how come there weren't 12 volt batteries kept at the location just in case something happened? Why would they need to get batteries flown in in the first place? Contingency plan and all that?
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They had multiple connections to the 500,000 volt grid and 275,000 volt grid for backup power. Something like 14 onsite generators. And about eight hours of battery power. That meant TEPCO management in Tokyo had almost eight hours to learn facts and made decisions. Even after being yelled at by the Plant Manager (something very unusual in Japanese culture), TEPCO refuse to permit venting. By the time TEPCO management made a decision, there were no batteries left charged.
Well operators worked frantically trying to save Reactor 2 for three days. That's how long TEPCO still did not provide those 12 volts batteries. No batteries. And no generators.
Is that hard to fathom? Not for me. I have seen business school trained managers do things that stupid routinely. Because they have no idea what the words really mean. Because they did not come from where the work get done.
The NHK report is scathing in that it exposes more facts all but withheld by TEPCO. NHK apparently had to limit so much information only to events in Reactors 3 and 4. NHK quotes on-site employees as citing 'no batteries' as a specific reason for the explosion in Reactor 3.