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tw · 06-21-2005, 06:45 PM

The US military policy was to support two Kuwait type wars simultaneously. Surge forces for both conflicts. Get both done. Then get the troops home.

Composition of the Reserves was intentionally changed after Vietnam to make the military more dependent on the Reserves. Generals wanted to make it difficult for politicians to conduct a war without public approval. IOW the war should first have a smoking gun - therefore would have a strategic objective, an exit strategy, and therefore would be won. Iraq had no smoking gun to justify it, had no strategic objective, and therefore has no exit strategy. Without a strategic objective, then its deja vue - Vietnam all over again.

Those Generals assumed the public would have more sense then a dictator in the White House. The public would only go to war when committed because it would require Reserve deployment. It worked in Kuwait. We learned of major deficiencies such as useless aircraft carriers, a severe shortage of refueling tankers, a shortage of fast response naval transport, the A-10 Warthog being the best Air Force plane, an Air Force command that still did not understand its functions and abilities, and too much delay between reconnaissance and field commanders.

The system works if top management does its jobs - #1 defines the strategic objective. The concept of two wars simultaneously assumed competent top management - a president with basic intelligence who could not execute a personal agenda without public approval.

A radical group of extremists used propaganda to, for example, get most Cellar dwellers to endorse this "Mission Accomplished" war. IOW a small political group (the neocons) subverted what the post Vietnam military tried to avoid.

Propositioned military supplies throughout the world are now down to less than 50% levels. With the "Mission Accomplished" war to drag on for many more years, then the military no longer has its 'second war' reserve. A capacity necessary for the invasion of Iran.

The two war concept assumed we get in, solve the problem, and then get out. It was not based upon some principle that we would invade other nations to enforce a new world order upon those other nations. It was not based on a war such as Vietnam. When the two war strategy was realigned, it assumed our leaders would never be so stupid as to do another Vietnam. And yet here we are, on the verge of asking about "a light at the end of that tunnel". Violence now expands into other Iraqi cities that previously saw no violence. Add Erbil to the list of cities now attacked by insurgents - just like Nam. The two war strategy assumed that a realignment of critical resources in the Reserves would never let another Vietnam happen. And yet here we go again.

Remember what happened during Vietnam. American military was so diminished everywhere in the world that, for example, when the USS Pueblo was taken by N Korea, then the US military had only six military aircraft in all Korea. And those aircraft were only equipped with nuclear armaments; had no ability to protect the Pueblo. In Vietnam, we quietly reduced troop strength everywhere else because literally the entire US military was tied up fighting a war with a third world nation - and losing. This is what happens when top management had an extremist agenda and therefore no fundamental capacity to understand who the real enemy was.

The US ability to fight a second war still exists - just is significantly diminished - just like during Nam.

06-21-2005, 06:45 PM	#5
tw Read? I only know how to write. Join Date: Jan 2001 Posts: 11,933	The US military policy was to support two Kuwait type wars simultaneously. Surge forces for both conflicts. Get both done. Then get the troops home. Composition of the Reserves was intentionally changed after Vietnam to make the military more dependent on the Reserves. Generals wanted to make it difficult for politicians to conduct a war without public approval. IOW the war should first have a smoking gun - therefore would have a strategic objective, an exit strategy, and therefore would be won. Iraq had no smoking gun to justify it, had no strategic objective, and therefore has no exit strategy. Without a strategic objective, then its deja vue - Vietnam all over again. Those Generals assumed the public would have more sense then a dictator in the White House. The public would only go to war when committed because it would require Reserve deployment. It worked in Kuwait. We learned of major deficiencies such as useless aircraft carriers, a severe shortage of refueling tankers, a shortage of fast response naval transport, the A-10 Warthog being the best Air Force plane, an Air Force command that still did not understand its functions and abilities, and too much delay between reconnaissance and field commanders. The system works if top management does its jobs - #1 defines the strategic objective. The concept of two wars simultaneously assumed competent top management - a president with basic intelligence who could not execute a personal agenda without public approval. A radical group of extremists used propaganda to, for example, get most Cellar dwellers to endorse this "Mission Accomplished" war. IOW a small political group (the neocons) subverted what the post Vietnam military tried to avoid. Propositioned military supplies throughout the world are now down to less than 50% levels. With the "Mission Accomplished" war to drag on for many more years, then the military no longer has its 'second war' reserve. A capacity necessary for the invasion of Iran. The two war concept assumed we get in, solve the problem, and then get out. It was not based upon some principle that we would invade other nations to enforce a new world order upon those other nations. It was not based on a war such as Vietnam. When the two war strategy was realigned, it assumed our leaders would never be so stupid as to do another Vietnam. And yet here we are, on the verge of asking about "a light at the end of that tunnel". Violence now expands into other Iraqi cities that previously saw no violence. Add Erbil to the list of cities now attacked by insurgents - just like Nam. The two war strategy assumed that a realignment of critical resources in the Reserves would never let another Vietnam happen. And yet here we go again. Remember what happened during Vietnam. American military was so diminished everywhere in the world that, for example, when the USS Pueblo was taken by N Korea, then the US military had only six military aircraft in all Korea. And those aircraft were only equipped with nuclear armaments; had no ability to protect the Pueblo. In Vietnam, we quietly reduced troop strength everywhere else because literally the entire US military was tied up fighting a war with a third world nation - and losing. This is what happens when top management had an extremist agenda and therefore no fundamental capacity to understand who the real enemy was. The US ability to fight a second war still exists - just is significantly diminished - just like during Nam.