[smoothmoniker]

Originally Posted by Beestie

3.1: Agreed. For me, metaphysical is just that part of physical that lies outside the realm of the verifiable. I think that over time, things move from the metaphysical into the physical (metaphysical entropy, if you will) as the opportunity to apply the scientific method avails itself. Its really all about cause and effect. Effects with unknown causes tend to be classified as metaphysical events or, at least, its an easy way to "process" and accept the event. Ultimately, all things become physical at some level since we are not capable of processing much of anything that lacks a physical component. Even Heaven and Hell are reduced to pleasure and pain at some level.

I think we're talking about different things here. I want to limit metaphysical to mean things which, if they exist at all, are necessarily beyond brute phyicalism. The best example would be God - if he exists at all, he is by nature a metaphysical being that cannot be reduced to brute physicalism. I agree that we have historically placed things in the metaphysical category that we would now call physical, but I think it would be better to say that we were mistaken in our category, not that the thing itself changed from being a metaphysical to a physical thing.

3.2: Any justification for believing anything metaphysical lies in the ability of the belief to predict future events or explain current events. My belief that God commands the sun to rise each morning is perfectly justified since he has never failed to make it so (its predictive and explanatory). Now that I understand the sun doesn't really rise at all (the earth spins), the belief is shattered. Therefore, as a more reasonable explanation is provided, beliefs gravitate from the metaphysical to the physical and the realm of the metaphysical is incrementally and irreversably depleted.

I think explanatory power and predictive power are pretty good things to put on the "Justification" list, and I would note that even though you count them toward justification for metaphysical ideas, they are also the two primary axioms for justifying physical ideas, notably scientific hypotheses. We are justified in believing the theory of gravity because it has comprehensive explanatory power of current states of reality, and because it has predictive power for future events.

3.3: No. It all boils down to the success of predictability - the likelihood or frequency that the assumption that the chair is there when you return is proven correct however justified or unjustified the belief that it was there in your absence. I believe that eclipses are God punishing us by withholding "His" light from us (mooning us, if you will). Bob, however thinks that it happens when Thor hurtles his battleax across the heavens and it blocks out the sun for a mintue. We can both justify the event (not enough people in church/forgot to sacrifice a virgin to Thor) but neither of us can predict the next one. When Newton comes along, causality/predictability become known and the metaphysical is diminished. However, there is nothing to say that Newton took into account all variables (as Einstein showed). And it may turn out that Einstein's models are not perfectly predictive. Until all variables are known (one can never be sure that there is not one more unknown variable), the idea of irrefutable predictability remains a goal and not a state. Therefore, validity can never be absolute.

Is this only the case for metaphysical events, or for physical as well? Take my example of the law of gravity - it has a perfect record for predictability. It predicts that any two objects of a certain mass placed within a certain field of each will be attracted, and lo and behold, every single time it's true. Can we say that this justification criterion for predictability reaches the point where we can positively assign the law of gravity to the "true" category?

3.4: That's an odd question. If there was no good reason to believe it was true (lack of explanatory value/ evidence of its falseness and/or no predictive value) then why would anyone believe it was true in the first place? Dogma would appear to be the subject of this question and, therefore, outside the scope of the discussion.

Let me give a for instance. A young girl in an oncology ward is told by her doctors and her parents that she is going to get better, and be completely healthy within a month. She believes this, and as a result, she is happy and content for 4 weeks, right up until the moment when she dies as a result of the cancer that her parents and doctors knew would kill her. She had a justified false belief. Put aside for a moment the ethics of the doctor lying to her, and ask the question, would there have been some benefit to the girl having a justified true belief that she was going to die that was greater than the benefit she derived from her justified untrue belief that she was going to live?

Basically, was it proper for her to exist in category I or category III?