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(3.1) Here, finally, is the crux of my argument: there are no special categories for metaphysical beliefs that are different from physical beliefs. Any statement that I may make about God can be measured along the same axis as my statement about the chair: it may either be true or false, and I may either be justified or unjustified in holding it. From this thesis there are several question that spring immediately to mind:
(3.2) First, what sort of things count toward justification for metaphysical beliefs, and are they essentially different than the things which count for justification in the case of physical beliefs?
(3.3) Is it ever possible to verify the truth of a statement, that is, to assign it with certainty to either the top or the bottom on our grid? This isn’t just a question for metaphysical statements, it holds for my statement about the chair as well. I’m going to take up the reason why it’s important to ask this question later on, but here’s a hint; I think you have to answer it the same way for both physical and metaphysical statements.
(3.4) Should we considered it proper to “believe” things that are outside of category I, or do I have an obligation as rational, thinking person to limit my set of beliefs to those things which, to the best of my ability to investigate and verify, are both true and justified.
Ok, at this point I’m going to take a little pause to let you guys either answer these questions if you think they’re interesting, or to argue with the categories that I setup in section 2.
Or, if everyone thinks this stuff is boring and meaningless, I'll just keep rambling on ahead, steadfast in my unjustified false belief that everyone finds me fascinating and sexy.
damn sexy.
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