[tw]

I am also a major fan of technology having even soldered together the ICs to make a computer long before PCs even existed. But I am also an engineer who must see major advantages to justify the more technically complex systems. The electronic voting only complicates the system without addressing or solving the original problems.

Yes paper only ballots can also be 'gamed' (as Undertoad notes) because (in part) too many hands are on the system. Paper only ballots, once sufficient, are not longer appropriate for large voting numbers and where voting error in hundreds (and maybe thousands) of votes was quite acceptable. We are also talking about storing and processing tens of tons of paper.

Posted up front were two necessary standards for making a poll work properly:

First, the vote must be written to (stored on) a 'write once' media. Paper does this. Paper votes cannot be modified without detection. Most electronic systems violate this principle.

Second, the voter must be able to confirm his vote is as he intended. Again paper does this.

Arguments should have started with these standards. Then have expanded to include the other standards I intentionally did not provide.

For example, (third point) voting must be anonymous. One must be able to vote without anyone knowing how that unique vote was entered. For example, if you walked away with a copy of how you voted, then others could intimidate your vote. The wife should be able to vote as she pleases without the husband having any say. Wife should not be able to prove the the husband that she voted as he demanded. One should not be able to 'sell' his vote. Also a vote must be completely untraceable meaning that time stamps on a voting record violate that anonymous voting principle.

Furthermore and fourth, a voting system must have the ability to confirm the entire voting record. An audit must be possible to both verify the count and verify the security. Punch cards locked in a ballot box do this. Should the punch cards be read by a machine, then a recount can be preformed on those punch cards. Currently the only voting method that appears to meet these voting criteria is optical voting machines as well as the older mechanical voting machines still being used in NY, CT, LA, most of eastern and Pittsburgh area PA, and western VA.

Fifth, the entire voting system must be secure. In Scientific American (if I remember the source correctly), authors literally walked into voting machine storage areas and opened doors to voting machines. No one challenged them. There was no log of everyone who entered and left the building.

Yes, I suspect so many are so technically naive (deficient) as to be enthralled by electronic voting rather than first learn the standards (principles) on which good voting practices are based. Above are some basic standards that all voting systems must be dependent on. Moreso, we have a serious problem with the requirements of a system. Even HAVA money was not even spent? Where has the administration been for almost four years (besides spending all this time and massive monies not even authorized to invade a nation that was a threat to no one)?

If voting is done electronically, then voting machines must be literally hardwired. The computer is a dedicated hardwired circuit, it features in-circuit confirmation that each 'hardwired' computer responds to (a unique code input results in a unique code output so that any machine without the hardwired chips would not verify - and I have not explained this sufficient to be understood), and the votes are written to a write once memory. A memory complete with security codes and the only place where the candidates names are provided to the machine. For example, a write once memory chip could then replace massive paper, contain code that traces that chip directly to a unique machine and that unique machine configuration, is handled minimally (not be gamed like paper ballots), and is treated with all the security required of ballot boxes - complete with security handled by multiple people simultaneously.

Most every electronic machine I have read simply violates (and grossly) the principles of secure voting. Using disk drives and software program is a gross violation of secure voting principles. You have no way of knowing how your ballot is being written into the write many times and easy to manipulate memory. If every machine has the same hardwired voting machine - a computer that is literally only programmed unique only by the voting names on that write only IC (voting machine does not even have firmware), then we know your ballot is being written to the memory chips by the exact same hardware also operating in all adjacent counties. Either all voting machines are fraudulent - or none - and the same secure hardware (just like lever voting machines) is used every time.

Recount literally involves reading every vote from memory chip and the corresponding error detection codes. Recount instead becomes a confirmation process where all hardware and the data in that memory chip is verified by secure and independently random codes. IOW recount becomes a security audit as well as a count of votes permanently stored in a write only memory device.

Optical voting also has great advantages. First you vote. Then the vote is physcially taken to a machine that reads your vote media. Furthermore, your voting media (punch card, smart card, etc) is locked into a ballot box where a recount can be performed completely separate from the machine that original accepted and tallied your vote. Of course, the voter leaves 'anonymously' with no record of how they voted so their vote cannot be sold. You literally see what your voting media says how you voted when you submit that voting media to the separate hardwired counting machine. Two separated methods of tallying the vote so that a recount is secure and separate from the original counting machine.

Just some of the many ideas for voting - using principles that all electronic voting machines violate.

Diebold sells the AccuVote-TSX which provides no paper (or other) record to make security auditing possible nor any method where the voter can confirm his vote is being properly registered. AccuVote-TSX meets the paper record requirement by simply printing the final totals on paper - violates the reasons why that paper record is required. Voter is given a voter card that permits access to the voting machine just once. Diebold uses the Windows Operating System rather than a secure and dedicated embedded software program. Diebold is also the machines that created massive failures in a SanDiego county electronic last April when the hardware drained batteries of power before voting could even start. Probably good that the batteries did not die during voting. CA decertified all Diebold AccuVote machines in four counties for numerous problems with security, auditability, etc. UT believes Montgomery County is using Diebold machines.

Second large manufacturer is Sequoia Voting Systems Inc. Diebold and Sequoia claim to own 80% of he market. But ES&S claims to be the world's largest maker of electronic voting machines. Ironically, ES&S was founding by Todd and Bob Urosevitch. But Bob is now president of Diebold.

Provided above are but some five standards that a voting system must meet. Does your poll? Unfortunately, even good standards for polls - four years after the FL fiasco, still don't exist nationwide. Voting remains a hodge podge of some juridictions with people who learned the standards and logic; and other jurisdictions where officials are impressed (emotion replaces logic) only because the machines are computerized.